Feast of the Incarnation
On this Christmas Day, let me begin with a quote from the twentieth-century writer G. K. Chesterton: “When a person has found something which he prefers to life itself, he [sic] for the first time has begun to live.”
Jesus in his proclamation of the kingdom told us what we could prefer to life itself. The Bible ends by telling us we are called to be a people who could say, “Come, Lord Jesus” (Revelation 22:20), who could welcome something more than business as usual and live in God’s Big Picture.
We all have to ask for the grace to prefer something to our small life because we have been offered the Shared Life, the One Life, the Eternal Life, God’s Life that became visible for us in this world as Jesus.
What we are all searching for is Someone to surrender to, something we can prefer to life itself. Well here is the wonderful surprise: God is the only one we can surrender to without losing ourselves. The irony is that we actually and finally find ourselves, but now in a whole new and much larger field of meaning.
(Adapted from Preparing for Christmas with Richard Rohr, pp. 45, 71-73)
South Sudan's Challenge
Healing & Reconciliation
Sunday, December 26, 2010
Saturday, November 20, 2010
South Sudan unlikely to vote for unity -SPLM official
South Sudan unlikely to vote for unity -SPLM official
Mon 30 Jul 2007, 13:47 GMT
By Simon Apiku
KHARTOUM, July 30 (Reuters) - The reluctance of Sudan's dominant
northern party to implement key aspects of a north-south peace deal is
pushing southerners toward backing independence in a 2011 vote, a
southern leader said on Monday.
"Chances of unity are nil practically given the non-implementation and
the lack of confidence," Pagan Amum, secretary-general of the former
southern rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), told
Reuters.
The SPLM signed a deal in January 2005 with the National Congress
Party (NCP) ending Africa's longest civil war -- a bitter 20-year
conflict that claimed 2 million lives and drove more than 4 million
people from their homes.
The deal mandated power and wealth sharing, and granted south Sudan
the right to decide in a referendum in 2011 if it wanted to remain
united with the north.
But the SPLM accuses the NCP of stalling on the implementation of
important elements in the agreement such as the protocol on the
oil-rich Abyei region, border demarcation, security arrangements and
disarming of militias.
"What we are seeing is unity being made very unattractive because that
unity is being presented as unity to pursue narrow egoistic interests
by the elite in the north," Amum said.
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir says implementation of the 2005
agreement is going well, and denies any foot-dragging over the deal.
CONTROL OF OIL REGION
One of the agreement's key tasks was to demarcate borders of the Abyei
region, establishing control of its lucrative oil fields.
The NCP has rejected the findings of the independent Abyei Border
Commission, formed by the 2005 deal, saying it exceeded its mandate.
The SPLM accepted the commission's report.
"Definitely the entire peace process is in danger by Abyei not being
implemented, by SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) maintaining forces which
is an act of war in the south, claiming that they want to protect the
oil," Amum said.
The United Nations earlier this month said the SAF had missed a July 9
deadline to move its troops to the north under the peace deal and a
senior U.N. official in the south said SAF was still paying illegal
militias based in the south.
Under the agreement, only joint units should police the oil areas, but
these north-south units are not yet functioning.
For this reason the SPLM says it has also not withdrawn its troops
from the central Southern Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where joint
units are supposed to take over.
"If they maintain militia groups against the south when we have signed
peace, then we are in for war," said Amum.
A border committee formed in 2005 to agree on the frontier has yet to
complete its work.
Demarcation of the north-south border is crucial for a census due to
be held in November, elections expected to be convened in 2009 and the
referendum in 2011.
"I see things unfolding in the direction of intense struggle to ensure
the (north-south deal) being implemented," said Amum.
The SPLM on Monday marked the second anniversary of the death in a
helicopter crash of charismatic leader, John Garang.
Amum said Garang's death had left a void, but Garang's successor,
Salva Kiir, was strong enough to lead the movement.
Mon 30 Jul 2007, 13:47 GMT
By Simon Apiku
KHARTOUM, July 30 (Reuters) - The reluctance of Sudan's dominant
northern party to implement key aspects of a north-south peace deal is
pushing southerners toward backing independence in a 2011 vote, a
southern leader said on Monday.
"Chances of unity are nil practically given the non-implementation and
the lack of confidence," Pagan Amum, secretary-general of the former
southern rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), told
Reuters.
The SPLM signed a deal in January 2005 with the National Congress
Party (NCP) ending Africa's longest civil war -- a bitter 20-year
conflict that claimed 2 million lives and drove more than 4 million
people from their homes.
The deal mandated power and wealth sharing, and granted south Sudan
the right to decide in a referendum in 2011 if it wanted to remain
united with the north.
But the SPLM accuses the NCP of stalling on the implementation of
important elements in the agreement such as the protocol on the
oil-rich Abyei region, border demarcation, security arrangements and
disarming of militias.
"What we are seeing is unity being made very unattractive because that
unity is being presented as unity to pursue narrow egoistic interests
by the elite in the north," Amum said.
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir says implementation of the 2005
agreement is going well, and denies any foot-dragging over the deal.
CONTROL OF OIL REGION
One of the agreement's key tasks was to demarcate borders of the Abyei
region, establishing control of its lucrative oil fields.
The NCP has rejected the findings of the independent Abyei Border
Commission, formed by the 2005 deal, saying it exceeded its mandate.
The SPLM accepted the commission's report.
"Definitely the entire peace process is in danger by Abyei not being
implemented, by SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) maintaining forces which
is an act of war in the south, claiming that they want to protect the
oil," Amum said.
The United Nations earlier this month said the SAF had missed a July 9
deadline to move its troops to the north under the peace deal and a
senior U.N. official in the south said SAF was still paying illegal
militias based in the south.
Under the agreement, only joint units should police the oil areas, but
these north-south units are not yet functioning.
For this reason the SPLM says it has also not withdrawn its troops
from the central Southern Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where joint
units are supposed to take over.
"If they maintain militia groups against the south when we have signed
peace, then we are in for war," said Amum.
A border committee formed in 2005 to agree on the frontier has yet to
complete its work.
Demarcation of the north-south border is crucial for a census due to
be held in November, elections expected to be convened in 2009 and the
referendum in 2011.
"I see things unfolding in the direction of intense struggle to ensure
the (north-south deal) being implemented," said Amum.
The SPLM on Monday marked the second anniversary of the death in a
helicopter crash of charismatic leader, John Garang.
Amum said Garang's death had left a void, but Garang's successor,
Salva Kiir, was strong enough to lead the movement.
Sudan’s Elections and Birth Pangs of the South
Sudan’s Elections and Birth Pangs of the South
Philippe de Pontet
March 31, 2010
Sudan stands at a political crossroads on the eve of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections to be held in April 2010. Yet with the election date fast approaching, opposition parties and the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) are threatening to boycott over allegations of vote rigging. A last-minute boycott would throw both the election and the south’s referendum on independence (planned for next January) into a dangerous state of uncertainty.
It is more likely than not, however, that the SPLM will back off the boycott threat, as this move could undermine its core interest in holding the independence referendum on time next January. If so, the citizens of Africa’s largest nation will head to the polls on April 11-13 for the first time in decades. While President Omar al-Bashir will likely retain power in the end, it may well take a second-round run-off vote to win the outright majority required. For all of Sudan’s democratic shortcomings, this is not likely to be an Equatorial Guinea-style election where 98.5 percent of the electorate goes with the incumbent and everyone knows the results months in advance.
The stakes are high and there might well be surprises. Yet in Juba, the southern capital, the national election is practically a non-event, seen as merely a formality on the road to the January 2011 referendum on southern independence. That is the vote that counts, as far as the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its constituents are concerned. The national election is simply a box to be checked in the U.S.-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the last big-ticket item en route to the referendum.
The SPLM’s presidential nominee reflects its apathy. Instead of nominating a true party leader with deep support, it has put forth an energetic but little-known northern Muslim politician named Yasir Arman—an inclusive gesture, perhaps, but not a remotely viable candidate. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see whether Arman and a stable of established northern-based opposition candidates attract enough votes to deny President Bashir an outright majority in the first round, despite the apathy in the south and likely voter intimidation elsewhere.
The southern political elites from the SPLM and smaller parties will not boycott the national elections, but they will focus all of their resources, and political jockeying on those seats that they hope will form the government of an independent southern nation in less than a year. The elections for the southern presidency, governorships, and the Juba-based parliament all matter greatly in this context.
Since independence is already an article of faith in Juba, the political logic is clear: Why bother with an election whose operational life-span is less than 10 months when your own, long-cherished nation is about to be born? That is why Salva Kiir, president of the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, has set his sights on retaining that post while Yasir Arman has been dispatched to represent the SPLM’s nominal presidential ambitions in Khartoum.
If independence is seen as inevitable in Juba, how is it viewed in Khartoum? Is Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party prepared to live with an independent south, where more than two-thirds of the country’s oil reserves are found? What about the even more nationalistic or Islamist-oriented northern parties that could gain influence post-secession? Many Sudan experts, who have been sounding alarms about this from the moment the CPA was signed back in 2005, believe the answer is a resounding no, setting north and south on a collision course that could unleash a return to war.
Under this school of thought, the National Congress Party will throw up procedural obstacles and other subterfuges to postpone the referendum indefinitely, prompting the SPLM to declare independence unilaterally. A new nation would be born, but under the imminent risk of attack from the north.
Such a scenario, however, is by no means inevitable. There is evidence that Khartoum, and for that matter other key countries in the region such as Egypt, are not only prepared to live (albeit warily) with an independent south, but have come to expect it.
The Bashir government has scaled back its rhetoric against independence and senior Egyptian officials have quietly shuttled back and forth to Juba in recent months. The relevant question is no longer whether a new state will be born next year but whether it will live in peace with its neighbor and be a viable independent nation, not a ward of the international community.
While peace is a precondition for the viability of the new nation, it is no guarantee. Landlocked, poorly governed (to date), resource-rich and prone to conflict, the world’s 193rd nation (by UN count) would be born with all of the characteristics of the world’s most vulnerable states outlined by Oxford economist Paul Collier. With a government dependent on oil for 98 percent of its revenues and almost no infrastructure outside of Juba, it is already clear that donors will have to foot most of the bills, probably to the tune of billions of dollars annually to help the government stay above water.
That said, a relapse of the civil war in the next year is unlikely despite the exceptionally low level of trust between Khartoum and Juba. The CPA has been bent many times since 2005 but has not broken, showing resilience under pressure. Despite the zero-sum mentality and brinksmanship that has characterized CPA implementation for years, at critical moments both sides have made tough compromises to keep the agreement alive.
Both sides have calculated that the benefits of sticking to the agreement, while often painful, outweigh the costs of relapse. The Bashir administration wants to keep its grip on power and to normalize relations with the West if possible; for Juba the prize is and has always been independence. These outcomes are well in sight now and need not be mutually exclusive.
Success will require another round of compromise, however, particularly on oil revenues. Some form of revenue-sharing on oil will need to be maintained to soften the economic blow of southern succession for Khartoum. As it turns out, the geography of oil in Sudan does not lend itself to zero-sum thinking by either side, as the main reserves are south but the pipelines and refineries are in the north. Juba and Khartoum will have to cooperate if either side is to benefit.
This reality, along with diplomatic pressures on a southern government that desires international recognition, will facilitate a compromise that keeps some oil revenues flowing to Khartoum (though probably less than the 50 percent cut it currently gets).
These negotiations need to begin in earnest now. They cannot wait until January 2011, the day after the referendum vote. By then, the six month transition to statehood should already be underway, with everything from border demarcation to securing diplomatic recognition on the to-do list, little of which will be easy. Khartoum will need assurance that southern independence will not come at its expense, whether economically or diplomatically.
Here the U.S. administration has a critical, albeit politically difficult, role to play by taking concrete measures towards sanctions removal and normalization if the elections are relatively credible and the referendum takes place on schedule. This diplomatic carrot, which has been dangled for years, would give Khartoum further incentive to accept southern independence.
Even if this relatively peaceful scenario transpires over the next 10 months, it is not at all clear that the newly independent south will be a self-sufficient, viable state. Juba’s natural allies (including the United States, European Union and neighbors in the region such as Kenya and Ethiopia) are all worried that southern Sudan could become Africa’s next basket-case, not to mention an inspiration for separatist movements across the continent, beginning with other regions in Sudan such as Darfur.
Competition for scarce resources already pits communities and ethnic groups against one another, leading to casualty figures in the south that outnumbered those in Darfur last year. It may be that by January 2012, the newspaper headlines on Sudan will not be warning of a return to war between north and south, but rather of growing disappointment, ethnic rivalry, and unrest within the south itself.
Philippe de Pontet is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at Eurasia Group.
Philippe de Pontet
March 31, 2010
Sudan stands at a political crossroads on the eve of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections to be held in April 2010. Yet with the election date fast approaching, opposition parties and the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) are threatening to boycott over allegations of vote rigging. A last-minute boycott would throw both the election and the south’s referendum on independence (planned for next January) into a dangerous state of uncertainty.
It is more likely than not, however, that the SPLM will back off the boycott threat, as this move could undermine its core interest in holding the independence referendum on time next January. If so, the citizens of Africa’s largest nation will head to the polls on April 11-13 for the first time in decades. While President Omar al-Bashir will likely retain power in the end, it may well take a second-round run-off vote to win the outright majority required. For all of Sudan’s democratic shortcomings, this is not likely to be an Equatorial Guinea-style election where 98.5 percent of the electorate goes with the incumbent and everyone knows the results months in advance.
The stakes are high and there might well be surprises. Yet in Juba, the southern capital, the national election is practically a non-event, seen as merely a formality on the road to the January 2011 referendum on southern independence. That is the vote that counts, as far as the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its constituents are concerned. The national election is simply a box to be checked in the U.S.-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the last big-ticket item en route to the referendum.
The SPLM’s presidential nominee reflects its apathy. Instead of nominating a true party leader with deep support, it has put forth an energetic but little-known northern Muslim politician named Yasir Arman—an inclusive gesture, perhaps, but not a remotely viable candidate. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see whether Arman and a stable of established northern-based opposition candidates attract enough votes to deny President Bashir an outright majority in the first round, despite the apathy in the south and likely voter intimidation elsewhere.
The southern political elites from the SPLM and smaller parties will not boycott the national elections, but they will focus all of their resources, and political jockeying on those seats that they hope will form the government of an independent southern nation in less than a year. The elections for the southern presidency, governorships, and the Juba-based parliament all matter greatly in this context.
Since independence is already an article of faith in Juba, the political logic is clear: Why bother with an election whose operational life-span is less than 10 months when your own, long-cherished nation is about to be born? That is why Salva Kiir, president of the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, has set his sights on retaining that post while Yasir Arman has been dispatched to represent the SPLM’s nominal presidential ambitions in Khartoum.
If independence is seen as inevitable in Juba, how is it viewed in Khartoum? Is Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party prepared to live with an independent south, where more than two-thirds of the country’s oil reserves are found? What about the even more nationalistic or Islamist-oriented northern parties that could gain influence post-secession? Many Sudan experts, who have been sounding alarms about this from the moment the CPA was signed back in 2005, believe the answer is a resounding no, setting north and south on a collision course that could unleash a return to war.
Under this school of thought, the National Congress Party will throw up procedural obstacles and other subterfuges to postpone the referendum indefinitely, prompting the SPLM to declare independence unilaterally. A new nation would be born, but under the imminent risk of attack from the north.
Such a scenario, however, is by no means inevitable. There is evidence that Khartoum, and for that matter other key countries in the region such as Egypt, are not only prepared to live (albeit warily) with an independent south, but have come to expect it.
The Bashir government has scaled back its rhetoric against independence and senior Egyptian officials have quietly shuttled back and forth to Juba in recent months. The relevant question is no longer whether a new state will be born next year but whether it will live in peace with its neighbor and be a viable independent nation, not a ward of the international community.
While peace is a precondition for the viability of the new nation, it is no guarantee. Landlocked, poorly governed (to date), resource-rich and prone to conflict, the world’s 193rd nation (by UN count) would be born with all of the characteristics of the world’s most vulnerable states outlined by Oxford economist Paul Collier. With a government dependent on oil for 98 percent of its revenues and almost no infrastructure outside of Juba, it is already clear that donors will have to foot most of the bills, probably to the tune of billions of dollars annually to help the government stay above water.
That said, a relapse of the civil war in the next year is unlikely despite the exceptionally low level of trust between Khartoum and Juba. The CPA has been bent many times since 2005 but has not broken, showing resilience under pressure. Despite the zero-sum mentality and brinksmanship that has characterized CPA implementation for years, at critical moments both sides have made tough compromises to keep the agreement alive.
Both sides have calculated that the benefits of sticking to the agreement, while often painful, outweigh the costs of relapse. The Bashir administration wants to keep its grip on power and to normalize relations with the West if possible; for Juba the prize is and has always been independence. These outcomes are well in sight now and need not be mutually exclusive.
Success will require another round of compromise, however, particularly on oil revenues. Some form of revenue-sharing on oil will need to be maintained to soften the economic blow of southern succession for Khartoum. As it turns out, the geography of oil in Sudan does not lend itself to zero-sum thinking by either side, as the main reserves are south but the pipelines and refineries are in the north. Juba and Khartoum will have to cooperate if either side is to benefit.
This reality, along with diplomatic pressures on a southern government that desires international recognition, will facilitate a compromise that keeps some oil revenues flowing to Khartoum (though probably less than the 50 percent cut it currently gets).
These negotiations need to begin in earnest now. They cannot wait until January 2011, the day after the referendum vote. By then, the six month transition to statehood should already be underway, with everything from border demarcation to securing diplomatic recognition on the to-do list, little of which will be easy. Khartoum will need assurance that southern independence will not come at its expense, whether economically or diplomatically.
Here the U.S. administration has a critical, albeit politically difficult, role to play by taking concrete measures towards sanctions removal and normalization if the elections are relatively credible and the referendum takes place on schedule. This diplomatic carrot, which has been dangled for years, would give Khartoum further incentive to accept southern independence.
Even if this relatively peaceful scenario transpires over the next 10 months, it is not at all clear that the newly independent south will be a self-sufficient, viable state. Juba’s natural allies (including the United States, European Union and neighbors in the region such as Kenya and Ethiopia) are all worried that southern Sudan could become Africa’s next basket-case, not to mention an inspiration for separatist movements across the continent, beginning with other regions in Sudan such as Darfur.
Competition for scarce resources already pits communities and ethnic groups against one another, leading to casualty figures in the south that outnumbered those in Darfur last year. It may be that by January 2012, the newspaper headlines on Sudan will not be warning of a return to war between north and south, but rather of growing disappointment, ethnic rivalry, and unrest within the south itself.
Philippe de Pontet is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at Eurasia Group.
Feast of Christ the King (C)
Dhikr for the Feast of Christ the King (C)
Text: “The people stood by and watched; the rulers, meanwhile, sneered at him and said, "He saved others, let him save himself if he is the chosen one, the Messiah of God.” (Luke 23: 35)
Meditation: Christ the King is crucified for us as our RANSON that we may have life to the full… We do NOT simply stand and watch… We believe in this life-giving SACRIFICE and WITNESS and we are invited to do likewise...
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the text or Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the text remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the text silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the text in your life.
Text: “The people stood by and watched; the rulers, meanwhile, sneered at him and said, "He saved others, let him save himself if he is the chosen one, the Messiah of God.” (Luke 23: 35)
Meditation: Christ the King is crucified for us as our RANSON that we may have life to the full… We do NOT simply stand and watch… We believe in this life-giving SACRIFICE and WITNESS and we are invited to do likewise...
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the text or Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the text remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the text silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the text in your life.
Saturday, September 25, 2010
The 26th Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
Dhikr for the 26th Sunday in ordinary time (C)
Text: "There was a rich man who dressed in purple garments and fine linen and dined sumptuously each day. And lying at his door was a poor man named Lazarus, covered with sores, who would gladly have eaten his fill of the scraps that fell from the rich man's table. Dogs even used to come and lick his sores" (Luke 16: 19-21)
Meditation: The parable is a strong reminder to us that we cannot continue to dress in purple garments and dine sumptuously without the poor partaking at our table... Cuidate!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the text or Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the text remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the text silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the text in your life.
Text: "There was a rich man who dressed in purple garments and fine linen and dined sumptuously each day. And lying at his door was a poor man named Lazarus, covered with sores, who would gladly have eaten his fill of the scraps that fell from the rich man's table. Dogs even used to come and lick his sores" (Luke 16: 19-21)
Meditation: The parable is a strong reminder to us that we cannot continue to dress in purple garments and dine sumptuously without the poor partaking at our table... Cuidate!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the text or Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the text remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the text silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the text in your life.
Saturday, September 11, 2010
The 24th Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
Dhikr for the 24th Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
The Parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin and the Prodigal Son
(Luke 15: 1-32
Text: “So he got up and went back to his father. While he was still a long way off, his father caught sight of him, and was filled with compassion. He ran to his son, embraced him and kissed him.” (Luke 15: 20)
Meditation: The Father shows COMPASSION … RUNS TO MEET THE ERRING SON, EMBRACES HIM AND KISSES HIM… No question asked and NO recrimination and condemnation!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the text or Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the text remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the text silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the text in your life.
The Parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin and the Prodigal Son
(Luke 15: 1-32
Text: “So he got up and went back to his father. While he was still a long way off, his father caught sight of him, and was filled with compassion. He ran to his son, embraced him and kissed him.” (Luke 15: 20)
Meditation: The Father shows COMPASSION … RUNS TO MEET THE ERRING SON, EMBRACES HIM AND KISSES HIM… No question asked and NO recrimination and condemnation!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the text or Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the text remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the text silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the text in your life.
Sunday, September 5, 2010
Parable of the Turtles
THE TURTLES
A turtle family decided to go on a picnic. The turtles, being naturally slow about things, took seven years to prepare for their outing. Finally the turtle family left home looking for a suitable place. During the second year of their journey they found a place ideal for them at last!
For about six months they cleaned the area, unpacked the picnic basket, and completed the arrangements. Then they discovered they had forgotten the salt. A picnic without salt would be a disaster, they all agreed.
Three years passed and the little turtle had not returned. Five years...six years... then on the seventh year of his absence, the oldest turtle could no longer contain his hunger. He announced that he was going to eat and begun to unwrap a sandwich. At that point the little turtle suddenly popped out from behind a tree shouting, 'See! I knew you wouldn't wait. Now I am not going to go get the salt.'
After a lengthy discussion, the youngest turtle was chosen to retrieve the salt from home. Although he was the fastest of the slow moving turtles, the little turtle whined, cried, and wobbled in his shell. He agreed to go on one condition: that no one would eat until he returned. The family consented and the little turtle left.
----..
Lesson:
Some of us waste our time waiting for people to live up to our expectations. We are so concerned about what others are doing that we don't do anything ourselves.
A turtle family decided to go on a picnic. The turtles, being naturally slow about things, took seven years to prepare for their outing. Finally the turtle family left home looking for a suitable place. During the second year of their journey they found a place ideal for them at last!
For about six months they cleaned the area, unpacked the picnic basket, and completed the arrangements. Then they discovered they had forgotten the salt. A picnic without salt would be a disaster, they all agreed.
Three years passed and the little turtle had not returned. Five years...six years... then on the seventh year of his absence, the oldest turtle could no longer contain his hunger. He announced that he was going to eat and begun to unwrap a sandwich. At that point the little turtle suddenly popped out from behind a tree shouting, 'See! I knew you wouldn't wait. Now I am not going to go get the salt.'
After a lengthy discussion, the youngest turtle was chosen to retrieve the salt from home. Although he was the fastest of the slow moving turtles, the little turtle whined, cried, and wobbled in his shell. He agreed to go on one condition: that no one would eat until he returned. The family consented and the little turtle left.
----..
Lesson:
Some of us waste our time waiting for people to live up to our expectations. We are so concerned about what others are doing that we don't do anything ourselves.
Saturday, September 4, 2010
23rd Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
Dhikr for the 23rd Sunday in ordinary time (C)
Text: “In the same way, every one of you who does not renounce all his possessions cannot be my disciple.” (Luke 14: 33)
Meditation: The text warns us about our possessions. Often they become our idols – the silver and gold – the work of our human hands. They speak not, hear not and see not… Those who worship them become like them… as Ps. 115: 4-8 tells us. Cuidate!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the Dhikr in your life.
Text: “In the same way, every one of you who does not renounce all his possessions cannot be my disciple.” (Luke 14: 33)
Meditation: The text warns us about our possessions. Often they become our idols – the silver and gold – the work of our human hands. They speak not, hear not and see not… Those who worship them become like them… as Ps. 115: 4-8 tells us. Cuidate!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the Dhikr in your life.
Saturday, August 28, 2010
The 22nd Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
Dhikr for the 22nd Sunday in ordinary time (C)
Text: "When you hold a lunch or a dinner, do not invite your friends or your brothers or your relatives or your wealthy neighbors, in case they may invite you back and you have repayment. Rather, when you hold a banquet, invite the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind.” (Luke 14: 12-13)
Meditation: The Sunday Gospel is a strong challenge and a reminder to us that the poor and the hungry do have places at our table… else we are no different from the Pharisees and the Scribes!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the Dhikr in your life.
Text: "When you hold a lunch or a dinner, do not invite your friends or your brothers or your relatives or your wealthy neighbors, in case they may invite you back and you have repayment. Rather, when you hold a banquet, invite the poor, the crippled, the lame, and the blind.” (Luke 14: 12-13)
Meditation: The Sunday Gospel is a strong challenge and a reminder to us that the poor and the hungry do have places at our table… else we are no different from the Pharisees and the Scribes!
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the Dhikr in your life.
Vatican's Message to Muslims for Ramadan
Vatican Message to Muslims for Ramadan
"Christians Are Spiritually Close to You During These Days"
Christians and Muslims:
Together in overcoming violence among followers of different religions
Dear Muslim Friends,
1. 'Id Al-Fitr, which concludes Ramadan, presents, once again, a favorable occasion to convey to you the heartfelt wishes of serenity and joy on behalf of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue.
Throughout this month, you have committed yourselves to prayer, fasting, helping the neediest and strengthening relations of family and friendship. God will not fail to reward these efforts!
2. I am delighted to note that believers of other religions, especially Christians, are spiritually close to you during these days, as is testified by the various friendly meetings which often lead to exchanges of a religious nature. It is pleasing to me also to think that this Message could be a positive contribution to your reflections.
3. The theme proposed this year by the Pontifical Council, Christians and Muslims: Together in overcoming violence among followers of different religions, is, unfortunately, a pressing subject, at least in certain areas of the world. The Joint Committee for Dialogue instituted by the Pontifical Council and al-Azhar Permanent Committee for Dialogue among the Monotheistic Religions had also chosen this topic as a subject of study, reflection and exchange during its last annual meeting (Cairo, 23 - February 24, 2010). Permit me to share with you some of the conclusions published at the end of this meeting.
4. There are many causes for violence among believers of different religious traditions, including: the manipulation of the religion for political or other ends; discrimination based on ethnicity or religious identity; divisions and social tensions. Ignorance, poverty, underdevelopment are also direct or indirect sources of violence among as well as within religious communities. May the civil and religious authorities offer their contributions in order to remedy so many situations for the sake of the common good of all society! May the civil authorities safeguard the primacy of the law by ensuring true justice to put a stop to the authors and promoters of violence!
5. There are important recommendations also given in the above mentioned text: to open our hearts to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation, for a peaceful and fruitful coexistence; to recognize what we have in common and to respect differences, as a basis for a culture of dialogue; to recognize and respect the dignity and the rights of each human being without any bias related to ethnicity or religious affiliation; necessity to promulgate just laws which guarantee the fundamental equality of all; to recall the importance of education towards respect, dialogue and fraternity in the various educational arenas: at home, in the school, in churches and mosques. Thus we will be able to oppose violence among followers of different religions and promote peace and harmony among the various religious communities. Teaching by religious leaders, as well as school books which present religions in an objective way, have, along with teaching in general, a decisive impact on the education and the formation of younger generations.
6. I hope that these considerations, as well as the responses which they elicit within your communities, and with your Christian friends, will contribute to the continuation of a dialogue, growing in respect and serenity, upon which I call the blessings of God!
Jean-Louis Cardinal Tauran
President
Archbishop Pier Luigi Celata
Secretary
"Christians Are Spiritually Close to You During These Days"
Christians and Muslims:
Together in overcoming violence among followers of different religions
Dear Muslim Friends,
1. 'Id Al-Fitr, which concludes Ramadan, presents, once again, a favorable occasion to convey to you the heartfelt wishes of serenity and joy on behalf of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue.
Throughout this month, you have committed yourselves to prayer, fasting, helping the neediest and strengthening relations of family and friendship. God will not fail to reward these efforts!
2. I am delighted to note that believers of other religions, especially Christians, are spiritually close to you during these days, as is testified by the various friendly meetings which often lead to exchanges of a religious nature. It is pleasing to me also to think that this Message could be a positive contribution to your reflections.
3. The theme proposed this year by the Pontifical Council, Christians and Muslims: Together in overcoming violence among followers of different religions, is, unfortunately, a pressing subject, at least in certain areas of the world. The Joint Committee for Dialogue instituted by the Pontifical Council and al-Azhar Permanent Committee for Dialogue among the Monotheistic Religions had also chosen this topic as a subject of study, reflection and exchange during its last annual meeting (Cairo, 23 - February 24, 2010). Permit me to share with you some of the conclusions published at the end of this meeting.
4. There are many causes for violence among believers of different religious traditions, including: the manipulation of the religion for political or other ends; discrimination based on ethnicity or religious identity; divisions and social tensions. Ignorance, poverty, underdevelopment are also direct or indirect sources of violence among as well as within religious communities. May the civil and religious authorities offer their contributions in order to remedy so many situations for the sake of the common good of all society! May the civil authorities safeguard the primacy of the law by ensuring true justice to put a stop to the authors and promoters of violence!
5. There are important recommendations also given in the above mentioned text: to open our hearts to mutual forgiveness and reconciliation, for a peaceful and fruitful coexistence; to recognize what we have in common and to respect differences, as a basis for a culture of dialogue; to recognize and respect the dignity and the rights of each human being without any bias related to ethnicity or religious affiliation; necessity to promulgate just laws which guarantee the fundamental equality of all; to recall the importance of education towards respect, dialogue and fraternity in the various educational arenas: at home, in the school, in churches and mosques. Thus we will be able to oppose violence among followers of different religions and promote peace and harmony among the various religious communities. Teaching by religious leaders, as well as school books which present religions in an objective way, have, along with teaching in general, a decisive impact on the education and the formation of younger generations.
6. I hope that these considerations, as well as the responses which they elicit within your communities, and with your Christian friends, will contribute to the continuation of a dialogue, growing in respect and serenity, upon which I call the blessings of God!
Jean-Louis Cardinal Tauran
President
Archbishop Pier Luigi Celata
Secretary
Saturday, August 14, 2010
The Feast of the Assumption of the BVM
Solemnity of the Assumption of the BVM
Text: “And how does this happen to me that the mother of my Lord should come to me? For at the moment the sound of your greeting reached my ears, the infant in my womb leaped for joy. Blessed are you who believed that what was spoken to you by the Lord would be fulfilled." (Luke 1: 43-45)
Meditation: The Feast of the Assumption invites us to reflect on the extraordinary story of two women sharing their faith, hope, and happiness as they prepare for motherhood - Elizabeth, who is old and barren, and Mary, a young betrothed virgin. In both stories the two women believed –and God causes life to surge forth from barren wombs and empty tombs.
Or
Dhikr for the 20th Sunday in ordinary time (C)
Text: "I have come to set the earth on fire, and how I wish it were already blazing! There is a baptism with which I must be baptized, and how great is my anguish until it is accomplished! (Luke 12: 49-50)
Meditation: Jesus spoke of his own Baptism of fire – his suffering, death and resurrection that other may have life… It is the fire that burns yet purifies. The fire in our life is always the symbol of energy and zeal. Hold on to that fire else we become a walking dead…
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the Dhikr in your life.
Text: “And how does this happen to me that the mother of my Lord should come to me? For at the moment the sound of your greeting reached my ears, the infant in my womb leaped for joy. Blessed are you who believed that what was spoken to you by the Lord would be fulfilled." (Luke 1: 43-45)
Meditation: The Feast of the Assumption invites us to reflect on the extraordinary story of two women sharing their faith, hope, and happiness as they prepare for motherhood - Elizabeth, who is old and barren, and Mary, a young betrothed virgin. In both stories the two women believed –and God causes life to surge forth from barren wombs and empty tombs.
Or
Dhikr for the 20th Sunday in ordinary time (C)
Text: "I have come to set the earth on fire, and how I wish it were already blazing! There is a baptism with which I must be baptized, and how great is my anguish until it is accomplished! (Luke 12: 49-50)
Meditation: Jesus spoke of his own Baptism of fire – his suffering, death and resurrection that other may have life… It is the fire that burns yet purifies. The fire in our life is always the symbol of energy and zeal. Hold on to that fire else we become a walking dead…
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind - RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the Dhikr in your life.
Sunday, August 8, 2010
How can suffering be redemptive?
The Gospel was first heard by people who were longing and thirsty, who were poor and oppressed in one sense or another. They knew their need and their emptiness. So we must go to the same place within ourselves to hear the Gospel. We must find the rejected and fearful parts within each of us and try to live there, if life has not yet put us there. That should allow us a deeper communion with the oppressed of the world, who are by far the majority of the human race since the beginnings of humanity.
If we wish to enter more deeply into this mystery of redemptive suffering—which also means somehow entering more deeply into the heart of God—we have to ask God to allow us to feel some of their pain and loneliness, not just to know it intellectually. It is what we feel that we finally act on. Knowing is often just that, and nothing more.
(Adapted from Richard Rohr's Job and the Mystery of Suffering, p. 15)
If we wish to enter more deeply into this mystery of redemptive suffering—which also means somehow entering more deeply into the heart of God—we have to ask God to allow us to feel some of their pain and loneliness, not just to know it intellectually. It is what we feel that we finally act on. Knowing is often just that, and nothing more.
(Adapted from Richard Rohr's Job and the Mystery of Suffering, p. 15)
Saturday, August 7, 2010
The 19th Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
Dhikr for the 19th Sunday in Ordinary Time (C)
Text: “Do not be afraid any longer, little flock, for your Father is pleased to give you the kingdom. Sell your belongings and give alms. Provide money bags for yourselves that do not wear out, an inexhaustible treasure in heaven that no thief can reach nor moth destroy. For where your treasure is, there also will your heart be.” (Luke 12: 32-34)
Meditation: The kingdom is given to us for FREE! The gospel challenge to us is show that that we, truly, treasure the kingdom…in our words and deeds.
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your
heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind -
RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the
Dhikr in your life.
Text: “Do not be afraid any longer, little flock, for your Father is pleased to give you the kingdom. Sell your belongings and give alms. Provide money bags for yourselves that do not wear out, an inexhaustible treasure in heaven that no thief can reach nor moth destroy. For where your treasure is, there also will your heart be.” (Luke 12: 32-34)
Meditation: The kingdom is given to us for FREE! The gospel challenge to us is show that that we, truly, treasure the kingdom…in our words and deeds.
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
1st step: Write the Dhikr (the Arabic word for REMEMBRANCE) in your
heart.
2nd step: Let the Dhikr remain always in on your lips and mind -
RECITING the Dhikr silently as often as possible...
3rd step: Be attentive to the disclosure of the meaning/s of the
Dhikr in your life.
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Our Father Sunday
Dhikr for the 17th Sunday in the ordinary time (C): Our Father Sunday
Text: "And I tell you, ask and you will receive; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you. For everyone who asks, receives; and the one who seeks, finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened.” (Luke 11: 9-10)
Meditation: We need to hold on to our belief… they are the basis of our HOPE and do not tire in praying, asking, seeking and knocking…
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Text: "And I tell you, ask and you will receive; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you. For everyone who asks, receives; and the one who seeks, finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened.” (Luke 11: 9-10)
Meditation: We need to hold on to our belief… they are the basis of our HOPE and do not tire in praying, asking, seeking and knocking…
DHIKR SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Loving one's enemies...
Do we really want our leaders to love our enemies?
The greatest and the summit of Jesus' commandments and the most radical of all of his teachings is, “You must love your enemies” (Matthew 5:44). How many of us love other people who kick us around or those who make it hard for us? Do we even know how to do this? Is it something we desire to do? Let’s admit that our culture sees this as weak, capitulating, soft, dangerous, and “effeminate” for men—and is even seen this way by many women. Christian countries have never been known for obeying this commandment, to my knowledge. In fact, you would never be elected or admired if you even talked this way. We have a problem here.
We do not really like or understand love as Jesus teaches it. As Fr. Zossima says in Dostoevsky’s, The Brothers Karamazov: “Love in practice is a harsh and dreadful thing compared to love in dreams. It may very well kill you.”
(Richard Rohr,OFM - June 2010)
The greatest and the summit of Jesus' commandments and the most radical of all of his teachings is, “You must love your enemies” (Matthew 5:44). How many of us love other people who kick us around or those who make it hard for us? Do we even know how to do this? Is it something we desire to do? Let’s admit that our culture sees this as weak, capitulating, soft, dangerous, and “effeminate” for men—and is even seen this way by many women. Christian countries have never been known for obeying this commandment, to my knowledge. In fact, you would never be elected or admired if you even talked this way. We have a problem here.
We do not really like or understand love as Jesus teaches it. As Fr. Zossima says in Dostoevsky’s, The Brothers Karamazov: “Love in practice is a harsh and dreadful thing compared to love in dreams. It may very well kill you.”
(Richard Rohr,OFM - June 2010)
Sunday, April 11, 2010
Updates on the Sudan
Updates on the Sudan
The Denis Hurley Peace Institute presents the second issue of The Inside Story – what we believe to be cutting edge insights into the countries that we work in. This issue features an analysis of the current situation in Sudan, five years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended 22 years of civil war. The article was written by John Ashworth, a long-time political analyst of the Sudan. The article examines the increasing violence within the south of Sudan, the marginalization of the southern leaders in the Government of National Unity and the deepening mistrust of the southerners towards the Islamic rulers of the North, as factors that may derail the peace process as the country gears up towards the first general elections scheduled in April and the referendum on the self-determination of the South in 2011.
The tortuous path towards democracy
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed five years ago on 9 January 2005 by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) brought an end to 22 years of civil war in southern Sudan and the marginalized areas of southern Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains and Abyei. However, the CPA is not comprehensive, not peace, nor is it an agreement. It is not comprehensive for two reasons: it only dealt with one of the conflicts in Sudan, and it is only between two warring parties, excluding all other political parties and military factions, north and south, as well as civil society. It is not peace. It is effectively a cease-fire agreement and a framework or road map for peace, which is scheduled for 2011. Of course it was a great achievement to move the conflict from the military to the political sphere, but this should not be confused with ‘peace’. It is not an agreement. It was signed reluctantly by the ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP), under intense diplomatic pressure. The final agreement is virtually identical to a draft presented by the Kenyan mediator, Lt Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo, about a year earlier which the NCP had rejected outright with undiplomatic language, suggesting it should be flushed down the toilet. NCP appeared to give away more than they could afford, and the implication is that they never intended to implement it.
Northern Sudanese governments have arguably not honored any agreement signed with the South since 1947, so southerners are understandably skeptical about the worth of this one. The international community accepted the CPA at face value and turned their attention to Darfur. This was a mistake. The war was not yet over. The Sudan Islamists in power might have lost the battle but not the war.
In light of the above, the main, if unspoken, priority of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) is preparing for the next war. It explains why SPLM has been slow to make the transition from an authoritarian liberation movement to a democratic political party; the conflict has not finished yet and they feel the need to present a strong front to the NCP while the political phase of conflict continues, and do not want to disintegrate just before the military phase breaks out again.
The basic problem in Sudan, whether in Darfur, the south or the east, is at the centre—the domination of Sudanese political systems by a small elite, currently embodied in the NCP regime, which seeks to control and marginalize the peripheries whilst also insisting on a particular cultural and religious identity for the whole of Sudan: the Arabic culture and the Islamic religion.
Violence in the South
In the last few months, there has been a significant increase in violence within the South, mostly between different ethnic groups. In the words of Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, the primate of the Episcopal Church of Sudan, the increasing violence is ‘the biggest concern in the country today. The only conclusion one can draw is that these are ancient disputes that are being deliberately stirred up into something much more damaging for the local people and the stability of our country as a whole. Who is doing this is still largely unknown, but it is evident from local reports received through the Church network that the arms smuggling, re-armament and incitement of tribal violence is being carried out by enemies of the CPA’.
There are consistent reports that this is being instigated by elements within the NCP. Senior figures in the SPLM have blamed the North for supplying arms, and there are plenty of grassroots reports of military aircraft being used, and military uniforms and brand new weapons being seen. ‘We suspect with some evidence that our partners in the North are still training, arming and sending to southern Sudan the former militia groups who fought alongside them during the war’, said General Oyay Deng Ajak, Minister of General Co-operation in the GOSS. If the violence is being orchestrated, it serves several purposes: to discredit and undermine the CPA; to retard development in the South; to give the impression that the South cannot govern itself and to give an excuse for the North to maintain troops in certain parts of the South, e.g. the oil fields, to ‘maintain security’.
Three armies
During the negotiations that led to the CPA, the NCP demanded that there should be only one national army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and that SPLA would be assimilated into it. SPLA, believing along with most southerners that ultimately military power is the only guarantee that the CPA will be implemented, insisted on two armies, SAF in the North and SPLA in the South. The compromise was three armies: SAF in the North, SPLA in the South, and the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), comprising 50% SAF and 50% SPLA, in key locations in the South and North (e.g. Khartoum).
In practice it has not worked. Not only are JIUs not acting under common command, but in many locations they are not able to stay together in the same barracks, and are placed several km apart. There have been cases of violence between the SAF and SPLA within JIU. The worst example of this happened in Malakal, the capital of the Upper Nile province. Here the Nuer militia (now part of the SAF contingent of the JIU) loyal to former warlord Gabriel Tanginya (promptly promoted Major-General by the Khartoum government), have fought with SPLA on two occasions (in 2006 and 2009) causing hundreds of deaths and injuries, and the flight of thousands of people from the city. Tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns were used.
The UN Mission in Sudan
During the peace negotiations, Sudanese church leaders were debating the need for an armed UN peace-keeping force with a robust mandate. One church leader stood up and declared, ‘Be careful what you ask for! You think you are going to get Canadian, Norwegian and South African peace-keepers. In fact you will get troops from Arab and Muslim states’. He has been proved correct.
There are significant numbers of peace-keepers from Muslim states (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan), from states with an interest in oil (e.g. India, China) and from Egypt, an Arab state which has a vested interest in the Nile water. While one would not want to question the professional neutrality of these armies, it seems strange that, following a war in which ethnicity, religion and oil were major factors, peacekeepers who are perceived as being linked to the enemy have been imposed on the South.
The UN peace-keeping mission in southern Sudan, composed of around 17 000 personnel, has generally been disappointing. One recurring complaint is their failure to patrol. Linked to this is their lack of knowledge of the context and their inability to analyze the situation properly. In situations where fighting has taken place, they have either been absent or unable to intervene effectively. While they have had some successes, there are serious doubts about the cost effectiveness of this hugely expensive operation.
Oil and borders
Oil creates a number of immediate problems in the South, but a key problem connected to the CPA is where the oil will be after 2011 in case of secession. Most of the oil is in the South, but a great deal of it is along the border. Already the Abyei region has lost oil fields following the ruling in The Hague, and since Abyei is expected to vote to join the South in anything like a free and fair referendum, that oil is potentially lost to the South. However, since the north-south border itself has not been demarcated, GOSS still hopes that some of that oil will find its way back into the South. In successive maps published in Khartoum since 1956, the border has been seen to move southwards. It will be a challenge for the Border Commission to reverse that trend.
The potential loss of oil revenue is a major problem for northern Sudan. While Khartoum does not depend as heavily on oil revenue as the South (over 50% of the annual budget as opposed to over 90% in the South), nevertheless it has been a key factor in both economic and military development. Future oil revenue plays a significant role in attracting foreign investment. Loss of this revenue may lead to serious destabilization in the North.
Thus, if the South secedes in 2011, a new oil compromise between North and South will be needed. An agreement to continue sharing revenue with the north would probably be politically unacceptable to southerners, but a commercial deal will be essential. However, while the South has the oil, the North has the pipeline and refining facilities. Even if a pipeline to East Africa is economically and logistically feasible, it will not happen quickly; meanwhile both North and South will be starved of oil revenue, leading to instability all round.
Government of National Unity
In the Government of National Unity (GONU) born from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 28% of positions have gone to SPLM. However the SPLM cabinet ministers are isolated and marginalized, and are little more than figureheads. Real power sits with the NCP counterpart in each ministry. It is widely believed that national security actively controls all significant ministries. As one minister of the South said, ‘They give me a nice office, a big car, police escorts, but I have no power. My civil servants (who are NCP appointees) do not brief me nor show me documents, and they don’t carry out my instructions’.
While SPLM has not articulated a public policy on GONU, it appears that they have given up on it. SPLM ministers in GONU continue to play the game, but the real energy of SPLM is channeled into trying to set up a viable government in Juba, the capital of the South, in preparation for independence.
Census
A national census, scheduled before the general elections in 2010 and the referendum in 2011, took place in May 2008 after several delays. The results of the census, indicating that there are 38 million Sudanese of whom only 8.3 million live in the South, are almost certainly not accurate. Southerners have rejected them completely as a basis for power and wealth-sharing, and for elections and the referendum. It is generally accepted that the results have been rigged in favour of the North.
Various conditions made the census in the South difficult, particularly logistics, weather, availability of personnel and census forms, and availability of funding for census personnel. Anecdotal evidence from workshops suggests that more than 40% of the southern population may not have been counted.
GOSS/SPLM made several key errors in the census process, which was always a political rather than a professional or technical process. The census did not include questions on religion or ethnicity. Since identity (both religious and ethnic) is one of the main root causes of the conflicts in Sudan, it seems incredible that this was omitted. SPLM was out-maneuvered by NCP into allowing the papers to be printed without these questions. One week before the census was due, SPLM dug in its heels and cancelled the census, but by this time it was too late and eventually it had to back down and allow the census to take place a week late.
After the census, the southern census body freely shared its raw data with its northern counterparts, but those in the North refused to reciprocate. It is generally believed that this is the point where the census was deliberately rigged, with northern statistics being changed in the light of southern figures. The southerners involved were mistakenly treating it as a technical rather than a political exercise. After the results were announced, GOSS and SPLM appeared to accept them, and only later challenged them officially. This points to miscommunication or worse within GOSS/SPLM.
Elections
In hindsight, it was a mistake to have elections during the interim period. This is a cease-fire period leading to the final peace deal after the referendum, and it would make more sense to leave the two signatories to complete the transition. Elections would then be held after the referendum, whether in two countries or one.
Nobody in the North or South believes the elections will be free and fair. The NCP held two sham elections during the war, and is experienced at rigging them. The conflict in Darfur will make elections there extremely difficult. Discussions among opposition parties in the North over an active boycott of the elections question whether anything resembling free and fair elections can take place in a climate of lack of freedom and the restrictive laws which are still in place.
‘Elections have been postponed twice, and there are indications that even if they will be held finally as scheduled now for April 2010, they may not be free and fair, based on experiences with the contested results of the recent census’, declared the Sudan Council of Churches.
Within the South there is a strong perception that the elections have already been rigged as a result of the census, which will be used to prepare the election and particularly constituency boundaries. Given the census claim that only 20% of the population is in the South (instead of the more widely accepted 33%), there is a strong possibility that even in a ‘free and fair’ vote, northern parties would win a large enough majority to be able to change the constitution and potentially derail the CPA.
Many in the North oppose the CPA, particularly the option of secession for the south. Although the CPA itself and the interim constitutions state that parties can only participate in the elections if they respect the terms of the CPA, it will be hard to argue against the ‘democratically expressed will of the people’ if 80% of parliamentarians decide to scrap the referendum.
While SPLM would clearly favour a cancellation of elections, the picture within NCP is more mixed. Some might be happy to cancel them; others see it as a chance to legitimize the NCP regime and end the stigma of having seized power by force in the 1989 coup d’état.
The main danger from postponement or cancellation is setting a precedent for cancelling other parts of the CPA, particularly the referendum. A further danger lies in recent statements by the NCP ‘that any action to stop the elections would threaten the political stability in the country and endanger the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ in response to calls from opposition parties to boycott the elections. This is a very worrying statement as it could be seen as a precursor to a State of Emergency and other drastic security-led actions in the name of ‘political stability’, and could be an excuse to put implementation of the CPA on hold. Elections are important to northerners, and to the populations of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.
Referendum
For most southerners (including southern opposition parties, many of which are more overtly pro-secession than SPLM), the referendum is the ultimate goal of the CPA. They are willing to compromise on many issues, and to overlook breaches in the implementation of the CPA, as long as they get to exercise their right of self-determination in 2011.
Thus the latest political battleground is the Referendum Law. During the peace negotiations, some voices from southern civil society urged that the Referendum Law be included in the CPA, but it was left out and has now become a problem.
The NCP is interpreting the priority for unity of the Sudanese nation as meaning that the Referendum Law must make secession difficult. Hence they called for a 75% threshold for secession. Most people in the South wanted it to be merely a simple majority. A compromise has now been reached with a simple majority for secession but a required turn-out of 60% of registered voters. There is also disagreement on whether southerners in the north of the country (there are three million of them living in camps around Khartoum) should be allowed to vote; where the seat of the Referendum Commission should be and who should be on it.
Even a simple majority is problematic. The logistic difficulties which have dogged the census will do the same for both the elections and the referendum. Although a huge majority of southerners want secession (over 90%, according to one survey), there still remains time for the NCP to chip away at their confidence in the GOSS/SPLM and the CPA, and to make promises about a united future.
The orchestrated violence in the South, and the inability of the SPLA to control it, adds further doubts. Perceptions of ethnic favoritism in GOSS may also alienate some communities. The census has already cast doubts on the true number of voters and where they are. The failure to set the north-south boundary leads to fears that some southerners might be disenfranchised by suddenly finding themselves in the North.
There is a suspicion that southern leaders will be ‘bought’. A senior SPLA officer said frankly, ‘They (NCP) will buy us intellectuals, politicians and leaders—we are corruptible. But they can’t buy every single person in southern Sudan. So as long as we ensure that the people in the villages get the chance to vote, we will win secession. We only need 51%!’ He may be proved right about being unable to buy the villagers’ votes, but wrong about the need for 51%.
Post-referendum scenarios
If there is a vote for secession which passes whatever percentage has been agreed, there are still scenarios which could lead to further conflict. One is that the North might attempt to annex parts of Unity and Upper Nile States, to keep control of the oil and agricultural projects, having already stationed troops there for ‘security’, and claiming that a majority in those states had voted for unity. Or they may publicly acknowledge secession of the whole South, but argue that they need to maintain ‘temporary’ control of those states to ensure security for the oil fields. Or they may simply refuse outright to grant independence, seeking support from AU states which fear a domino effect within Africa and an international community which tends to support the status quo. The international community must resist all these scenarios.
Even if secession does take place peacefully, southerners need to articulate what sort of society they want in their newly-independent state, and to find a way of resolving ethnic tensions. They also need a pragmatic working relationship with their new neighbour in the North—the oil may be in the South, but the pipeline is in the North.
As the Sudan Council of Churches says, ‘it is high time to also prepare for the period after the referendums and the popular consultations, and to start a process of identifying the implications of the various options, as well as to have a broad-based dialogue process to ascertain the future political and social setup’.
John Ashworth
Regional Representative
IKV Pax Christi Horn of Africa Programme
Note: this article was also featured as a special report in Worldwide
The Denis Hurley Peace Institute presents the second issue of The Inside Story – what we believe to be cutting edge insights into the countries that we work in. This issue features an analysis of the current situation in Sudan, five years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended 22 years of civil war. The article was written by John Ashworth, a long-time political analyst of the Sudan. The article examines the increasing violence within the south of Sudan, the marginalization of the southern leaders in the Government of National Unity and the deepening mistrust of the southerners towards the Islamic rulers of the North, as factors that may derail the peace process as the country gears up towards the first general elections scheduled in April and the referendum on the self-determination of the South in 2011.
The tortuous path towards democracy
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed five years ago on 9 January 2005 by the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) brought an end to 22 years of civil war in southern Sudan and the marginalized areas of southern Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains and Abyei. However, the CPA is not comprehensive, not peace, nor is it an agreement. It is not comprehensive for two reasons: it only dealt with one of the conflicts in Sudan, and it is only between two warring parties, excluding all other political parties and military factions, north and south, as well as civil society. It is not peace. It is effectively a cease-fire agreement and a framework or road map for peace, which is scheduled for 2011. Of course it was a great achievement to move the conflict from the military to the political sphere, but this should not be confused with ‘peace’. It is not an agreement. It was signed reluctantly by the ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP), under intense diplomatic pressure. The final agreement is virtually identical to a draft presented by the Kenyan mediator, Lt Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo, about a year earlier which the NCP had rejected outright with undiplomatic language, suggesting it should be flushed down the toilet. NCP appeared to give away more than they could afford, and the implication is that they never intended to implement it.
Northern Sudanese governments have arguably not honored any agreement signed with the South since 1947, so southerners are understandably skeptical about the worth of this one. The international community accepted the CPA at face value and turned their attention to Darfur. This was a mistake. The war was not yet over. The Sudan Islamists in power might have lost the battle but not the war.
In light of the above, the main, if unspoken, priority of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) is preparing for the next war. It explains why SPLM has been slow to make the transition from an authoritarian liberation movement to a democratic political party; the conflict has not finished yet and they feel the need to present a strong front to the NCP while the political phase of conflict continues, and do not want to disintegrate just before the military phase breaks out again.
The basic problem in Sudan, whether in Darfur, the south or the east, is at the centre—the domination of Sudanese political systems by a small elite, currently embodied in the NCP regime, which seeks to control and marginalize the peripheries whilst also insisting on a particular cultural and religious identity for the whole of Sudan: the Arabic culture and the Islamic religion.
Violence in the South
In the last few months, there has been a significant increase in violence within the South, mostly between different ethnic groups. In the words of Archbishop Daniel Deng Bul, the primate of the Episcopal Church of Sudan, the increasing violence is ‘the biggest concern in the country today. The only conclusion one can draw is that these are ancient disputes that are being deliberately stirred up into something much more damaging for the local people and the stability of our country as a whole. Who is doing this is still largely unknown, but it is evident from local reports received through the Church network that the arms smuggling, re-armament and incitement of tribal violence is being carried out by enemies of the CPA’.
There are consistent reports that this is being instigated by elements within the NCP. Senior figures in the SPLM have blamed the North for supplying arms, and there are plenty of grassroots reports of military aircraft being used, and military uniforms and brand new weapons being seen. ‘We suspect with some evidence that our partners in the North are still training, arming and sending to southern Sudan the former militia groups who fought alongside them during the war’, said General Oyay Deng Ajak, Minister of General Co-operation in the GOSS. If the violence is being orchestrated, it serves several purposes: to discredit and undermine the CPA; to retard development in the South; to give the impression that the South cannot govern itself and to give an excuse for the North to maintain troops in certain parts of the South, e.g. the oil fields, to ‘maintain security’.
Three armies
During the negotiations that led to the CPA, the NCP demanded that there should be only one national army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and that SPLA would be assimilated into it. SPLA, believing along with most southerners that ultimately military power is the only guarantee that the CPA will be implemented, insisted on two armies, SAF in the North and SPLA in the South. The compromise was three armies: SAF in the North, SPLA in the South, and the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), comprising 50% SAF and 50% SPLA, in key locations in the South and North (e.g. Khartoum).
In practice it has not worked. Not only are JIUs not acting under common command, but in many locations they are not able to stay together in the same barracks, and are placed several km apart. There have been cases of violence between the SAF and SPLA within JIU. The worst example of this happened in Malakal, the capital of the Upper Nile province. Here the Nuer militia (now part of the SAF contingent of the JIU) loyal to former warlord Gabriel Tanginya (promptly promoted Major-General by the Khartoum government), have fought with SPLA on two occasions (in 2006 and 2009) causing hundreds of deaths and injuries, and the flight of thousands of people from the city. Tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns were used.
The UN Mission in Sudan
During the peace negotiations, Sudanese church leaders were debating the need for an armed UN peace-keeping force with a robust mandate. One church leader stood up and declared, ‘Be careful what you ask for! You think you are going to get Canadian, Norwegian and South African peace-keepers. In fact you will get troops from Arab and Muslim states’. He has been proved correct.
There are significant numbers of peace-keepers from Muslim states (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan), from states with an interest in oil (e.g. India, China) and from Egypt, an Arab state which has a vested interest in the Nile water. While one would not want to question the professional neutrality of these armies, it seems strange that, following a war in which ethnicity, religion and oil were major factors, peacekeepers who are perceived as being linked to the enemy have been imposed on the South.
The UN peace-keeping mission in southern Sudan, composed of around 17 000 personnel, has generally been disappointing. One recurring complaint is their failure to patrol. Linked to this is their lack of knowledge of the context and their inability to analyze the situation properly. In situations where fighting has taken place, they have either been absent or unable to intervene effectively. While they have had some successes, there are serious doubts about the cost effectiveness of this hugely expensive operation.
Oil and borders
Oil creates a number of immediate problems in the South, but a key problem connected to the CPA is where the oil will be after 2011 in case of secession. Most of the oil is in the South, but a great deal of it is along the border. Already the Abyei region has lost oil fields following the ruling in The Hague, and since Abyei is expected to vote to join the South in anything like a free and fair referendum, that oil is potentially lost to the South. However, since the north-south border itself has not been demarcated, GOSS still hopes that some of that oil will find its way back into the South. In successive maps published in Khartoum since 1956, the border has been seen to move southwards. It will be a challenge for the Border Commission to reverse that trend.
The potential loss of oil revenue is a major problem for northern Sudan. While Khartoum does not depend as heavily on oil revenue as the South (over 50% of the annual budget as opposed to over 90% in the South), nevertheless it has been a key factor in both economic and military development. Future oil revenue plays a significant role in attracting foreign investment. Loss of this revenue may lead to serious destabilization in the North.
Thus, if the South secedes in 2011, a new oil compromise between North and South will be needed. An agreement to continue sharing revenue with the north would probably be politically unacceptable to southerners, but a commercial deal will be essential. However, while the South has the oil, the North has the pipeline and refining facilities. Even if a pipeline to East Africa is economically and logistically feasible, it will not happen quickly; meanwhile both North and South will be starved of oil revenue, leading to instability all round.
Government of National Unity
In the Government of National Unity (GONU) born from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 28% of positions have gone to SPLM. However the SPLM cabinet ministers are isolated and marginalized, and are little more than figureheads. Real power sits with the NCP counterpart in each ministry. It is widely believed that national security actively controls all significant ministries. As one minister of the South said, ‘They give me a nice office, a big car, police escorts, but I have no power. My civil servants (who are NCP appointees) do not brief me nor show me documents, and they don’t carry out my instructions’.
While SPLM has not articulated a public policy on GONU, it appears that they have given up on it. SPLM ministers in GONU continue to play the game, but the real energy of SPLM is channeled into trying to set up a viable government in Juba, the capital of the South, in preparation for independence.
Census
A national census, scheduled before the general elections in 2010 and the referendum in 2011, took place in May 2008 after several delays. The results of the census, indicating that there are 38 million Sudanese of whom only 8.3 million live in the South, are almost certainly not accurate. Southerners have rejected them completely as a basis for power and wealth-sharing, and for elections and the referendum. It is generally accepted that the results have been rigged in favour of the North.
Various conditions made the census in the South difficult, particularly logistics, weather, availability of personnel and census forms, and availability of funding for census personnel. Anecdotal evidence from workshops suggests that more than 40% of the southern population may not have been counted.
GOSS/SPLM made several key errors in the census process, which was always a political rather than a professional or technical process. The census did not include questions on religion or ethnicity. Since identity (both religious and ethnic) is one of the main root causes of the conflicts in Sudan, it seems incredible that this was omitted. SPLM was out-maneuvered by NCP into allowing the papers to be printed without these questions. One week before the census was due, SPLM dug in its heels and cancelled the census, but by this time it was too late and eventually it had to back down and allow the census to take place a week late.
After the census, the southern census body freely shared its raw data with its northern counterparts, but those in the North refused to reciprocate. It is generally believed that this is the point where the census was deliberately rigged, with northern statistics being changed in the light of southern figures. The southerners involved were mistakenly treating it as a technical rather than a political exercise. After the results were announced, GOSS and SPLM appeared to accept them, and only later challenged them officially. This points to miscommunication or worse within GOSS/SPLM.
Elections
In hindsight, it was a mistake to have elections during the interim period. This is a cease-fire period leading to the final peace deal after the referendum, and it would make more sense to leave the two signatories to complete the transition. Elections would then be held after the referendum, whether in two countries or one.
Nobody in the North or South believes the elections will be free and fair. The NCP held two sham elections during the war, and is experienced at rigging them. The conflict in Darfur will make elections there extremely difficult. Discussions among opposition parties in the North over an active boycott of the elections question whether anything resembling free and fair elections can take place in a climate of lack of freedom and the restrictive laws which are still in place.
‘Elections have been postponed twice, and there are indications that even if they will be held finally as scheduled now for April 2010, they may not be free and fair, based on experiences with the contested results of the recent census’, declared the Sudan Council of Churches.
Within the South there is a strong perception that the elections have already been rigged as a result of the census, which will be used to prepare the election and particularly constituency boundaries. Given the census claim that only 20% of the population is in the South (instead of the more widely accepted 33%), there is a strong possibility that even in a ‘free and fair’ vote, northern parties would win a large enough majority to be able to change the constitution and potentially derail the CPA.
Many in the North oppose the CPA, particularly the option of secession for the south. Although the CPA itself and the interim constitutions state that parties can only participate in the elections if they respect the terms of the CPA, it will be hard to argue against the ‘democratically expressed will of the people’ if 80% of parliamentarians decide to scrap the referendum.
While SPLM would clearly favour a cancellation of elections, the picture within NCP is more mixed. Some might be happy to cancel them; others see it as a chance to legitimize the NCP regime and end the stigma of having seized power by force in the 1989 coup d’état.
The main danger from postponement or cancellation is setting a precedent for cancelling other parts of the CPA, particularly the referendum. A further danger lies in recent statements by the NCP ‘that any action to stop the elections would threaten the political stability in the country and endanger the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ in response to calls from opposition parties to boycott the elections. This is a very worrying statement as it could be seen as a precursor to a State of Emergency and other drastic security-led actions in the name of ‘political stability’, and could be an excuse to put implementation of the CPA on hold. Elections are important to northerners, and to the populations of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.
Referendum
For most southerners (including southern opposition parties, many of which are more overtly pro-secession than SPLM), the referendum is the ultimate goal of the CPA. They are willing to compromise on many issues, and to overlook breaches in the implementation of the CPA, as long as they get to exercise their right of self-determination in 2011.
Thus the latest political battleground is the Referendum Law. During the peace negotiations, some voices from southern civil society urged that the Referendum Law be included in the CPA, but it was left out and has now become a problem.
The NCP is interpreting the priority for unity of the Sudanese nation as meaning that the Referendum Law must make secession difficult. Hence they called for a 75% threshold for secession. Most people in the South wanted it to be merely a simple majority. A compromise has now been reached with a simple majority for secession but a required turn-out of 60% of registered voters. There is also disagreement on whether southerners in the north of the country (there are three million of them living in camps around Khartoum) should be allowed to vote; where the seat of the Referendum Commission should be and who should be on it.
Even a simple majority is problematic. The logistic difficulties which have dogged the census will do the same for both the elections and the referendum. Although a huge majority of southerners want secession (over 90%, according to one survey), there still remains time for the NCP to chip away at their confidence in the GOSS/SPLM and the CPA, and to make promises about a united future.
The orchestrated violence in the South, and the inability of the SPLA to control it, adds further doubts. Perceptions of ethnic favoritism in GOSS may also alienate some communities. The census has already cast doubts on the true number of voters and where they are. The failure to set the north-south boundary leads to fears that some southerners might be disenfranchised by suddenly finding themselves in the North.
There is a suspicion that southern leaders will be ‘bought’. A senior SPLA officer said frankly, ‘They (NCP) will buy us intellectuals, politicians and leaders—we are corruptible. But they can’t buy every single person in southern Sudan. So as long as we ensure that the people in the villages get the chance to vote, we will win secession. We only need 51%!’ He may be proved right about being unable to buy the villagers’ votes, but wrong about the need for 51%.
Post-referendum scenarios
If there is a vote for secession which passes whatever percentage has been agreed, there are still scenarios which could lead to further conflict. One is that the North might attempt to annex parts of Unity and Upper Nile States, to keep control of the oil and agricultural projects, having already stationed troops there for ‘security’, and claiming that a majority in those states had voted for unity. Or they may publicly acknowledge secession of the whole South, but argue that they need to maintain ‘temporary’ control of those states to ensure security for the oil fields. Or they may simply refuse outright to grant independence, seeking support from AU states which fear a domino effect within Africa and an international community which tends to support the status quo. The international community must resist all these scenarios.
Even if secession does take place peacefully, southerners need to articulate what sort of society they want in their newly-independent state, and to find a way of resolving ethnic tensions. They also need a pragmatic working relationship with their new neighbour in the North—the oil may be in the South, but the pipeline is in the North.
As the Sudan Council of Churches says, ‘it is high time to also prepare for the period after the referendums and the popular consultations, and to start a process of identifying the implications of the various options, as well as to have a broad-based dialogue process to ascertain the future political and social setup’.
John Ashworth
Regional Representative
IKV Pax Christi Horn of Africa Programme
Note: this article was also featured as a special report in Worldwide
Thursday, April 1, 2010
Sudan's Elections and Birth Pangs of the South
Sudan’s Elections and Birth Pangs of the South
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Philippe de Pontet March 31, 2010
Sudan stands at a political crossroads on the eve of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections to be held in April 2010. For the first time in decades, the citizens of Africa’s largest nation will head to the polls. While President Omar al-Bashir will likely retain power in the end, it may well take a second-round run-off vote to win the outright majority required. For all of Sudan’s democratic shortcomings, this is not likely to be an Equatorial Guinea-style election where 98.5 percent of the electorate goes with the incumbent and everyone knows the results months in advance. The stakes are high and there might well be surprises.
Yet in Juba, the southern capital, the national election is practically a non-event, seen as merely a formality on the road to the January 2011 referendum on southern independence. That is the vote that counts, as far as the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its constituents are concerned. The national election is simply a box to be checked in the U.S.-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the last big-ticket item en route to the referendum.
The SPLM’s presidential nominee reflects its apathy. Instead of nominating a true party leader with deep support, it has put forth an energetic but little-known northern Muslim politician named Yasir Arman—an inclusive gesture, perhaps, but not a remotely viable candidate. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see whether Arman and a stable of established northern-based opposition candidates attract enough votes to deny President Bashir an outright majority in the first round, despite the apathy in the south and likely voter intimidation elsewhere.
The southern political elites from the SPLM and smaller parties will not boycott the national elections, but they will focus all of their resources, and political jockeying on those seats that they hope will form the government of an independent southern nation in less than a year. The elections for the southern presidency, governorships, and the Juba-based parliament all matter greatly in this context. Since independence is already an article of faith in Juba, the political logic is clear: Why bother with an election whose operational life-span is less than 10 months when your own, long-cherished nation is about to be born? That is why Salva Kiir, president of the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, has set his sights on retaining that post while Yasir Arman has been dispatched to represent the SPLM’s nominal presidential ambitions in Khartoum.
If independence is seen as inevitable in Juba, how is it viewed in Khartoum? Is Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party prepared to live with an independent south, where more than two-thirds of the country’s oil reserves are found? What about the even more nationalistic or Islamist-oriented northern parties that could gain influence post-secession? Many Sudan experts, who have been sounding alarms about this from the moment the CPA was signed back in 2005, believe the answer is a resounding no, setting north and south on a collision course that could unleash a return to war. Under this school of thought, the National Congress Party will throw up procedural obstacles and other subterfuges to postpone the referendum indefinitely, prompting the SPLM to declare independence unilaterally. A new nation would be born, but under the imminent risk of attack from the north.
Such a scenario, however, is by no means inevitable. There is evidence that Khartoum, and for that matter other key countries in the region such as Egypt, are not only prepared to live (albeit warily) with an independent south, but have come to expect it. The Bashir government has scaled back its rhetoric against independence and senior Egyptian officials have quietly shuttled back and forth to Juba in recent months. The relevant question is no longer whether a new state will be born next year but whether it will live in peace with its neighbor and be a viable independent nation, not a ward of the international community.
While peace is a precondition for the viability of the new nation, it is no guarantee. Landlocked, poorly governed (to date), resource-rich and prone to conflict, the world’s 193rd nation (by UN count) would be born with all of the characteristics of the world’s most vulnerable states outlined by Oxford economist Paul Collier. With a government dependent on oil for 98 percent of its revenues and almost no infrastructure outside of Juba, it is already clear that donors will have to foot most of the bills, probably to the tune of billions of dollars annually to help the government stay above water.
That said, a relapse of the civil war in the next year is unlikely despite the exceptionally low level of trust between Khartoum and Juba. The CPA has been bent many times since 2005 but has not broken, showing resilience under pressure. Despite the zero-sum mentality and brinksmanship that has characterized CPA implementation for years, at critical moments both sides have made tough compromises to keep the agreement alive. Both sides have calculated that the benefits of sticking to the agreement, while often painful, outweigh the costs of relapse. The Bashir administration wants to keep its grip on power and to normalize relations with the West if possible; for Juba the prize is and has always been independence. These outcomes are well in sight now and need not be mutually exclusive.
Success will require another round of compromise, however, particularly on oil revenues. Some form of revenue-sharing on oil will need to be maintained to soften the economic blow of southern succession for Khartoum. As it turns out, the geography of oil in Sudan does not lend itself to zero-sum thinking by either side, as the main reserves are south but the pipelines and refineries are in the north. Juba and Khartoum will have to cooperate if either side is to benefit. This reality, along with diplomatic pressures on a southern government that desires international recognition, will facilitate a compromise that keeps some oil revenues flowing to Khartoum (though probably less than the 50 percent cut it currently gets).
These negotiations need to begin in earnest now. They cannot wait until January 2011, the day after the referendum vote. By then, the six month transition to statehood should already be underway, with everything from border demarcation to securing diplomatic recognition on the to-do list, little of which will be easy. Khartoum will need assurance that southern independence will not come at its expense, whether economically or diplomatically. Here the U.S. administration has a critical, albeit politically difficult, role to play by taking concrete measures towards sanctions removal and normalization if the elections are relatively credible and the referendum takes place on schedule. This diplomatic carrot, which has been dangled for years, would give Khartoum further incentive to accept southern independence.
Even if this relatively peaceful scenario transpires over the next 10 months, it is not at all clear that the newly independent south will be a self-sufficient, viable state. Juba’s natural allies (including the United States, European Union and neighbors in the region such as Kenya and Ethiopia) are all worried that southern Sudan could become Africa’s next basket-case, not to mention an inspiration for separatist movements across the continent, beginning with other regions in Sudan such as Darfur. Competition for scarce resources already pits communities and ethnic groups against one another, leading to casualty figures in the south that outnumbered those in Darfur last year. It may be that by January 2012, the newspaper headlines on Sudan will not be warning of a return to war between north and south, but rather of growing disappointment, ethnic rivalry, and unrest within the south itself.
Philippe de Pontet is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at Eurasia Group.
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Philippe de Pontet March 31, 2010
Sudan stands at a political crossroads on the eve of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections to be held in April 2010. For the first time in decades, the citizens of Africa’s largest nation will head to the polls. While President Omar al-Bashir will likely retain power in the end, it may well take a second-round run-off vote to win the outright majority required. For all of Sudan’s democratic shortcomings, this is not likely to be an Equatorial Guinea-style election where 98.5 percent of the electorate goes with the incumbent and everyone knows the results months in advance. The stakes are high and there might well be surprises.
Yet in Juba, the southern capital, the national election is practically a non-event, seen as merely a formality on the road to the January 2011 referendum on southern independence. That is the vote that counts, as far as the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its constituents are concerned. The national election is simply a box to be checked in the U.S.-brokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the last big-ticket item en route to the referendum.
The SPLM’s presidential nominee reflects its apathy. Instead of nominating a true party leader with deep support, it has put forth an energetic but little-known northern Muslim politician named Yasir Arman—an inclusive gesture, perhaps, but not a remotely viable candidate. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see whether Arman and a stable of established northern-based opposition candidates attract enough votes to deny President Bashir an outright majority in the first round, despite the apathy in the south and likely voter intimidation elsewhere.
The southern political elites from the SPLM and smaller parties will not boycott the national elections, but they will focus all of their resources, and political jockeying on those seats that they hope will form the government of an independent southern nation in less than a year. The elections for the southern presidency, governorships, and the Juba-based parliament all matter greatly in this context. Since independence is already an article of faith in Juba, the political logic is clear: Why bother with an election whose operational life-span is less than 10 months when your own, long-cherished nation is about to be born? That is why Salva Kiir, president of the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, has set his sights on retaining that post while Yasir Arman has been dispatched to represent the SPLM’s nominal presidential ambitions in Khartoum.
If independence is seen as inevitable in Juba, how is it viewed in Khartoum? Is Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party prepared to live with an independent south, where more than two-thirds of the country’s oil reserves are found? What about the even more nationalistic or Islamist-oriented northern parties that could gain influence post-secession? Many Sudan experts, who have been sounding alarms about this from the moment the CPA was signed back in 2005, believe the answer is a resounding no, setting north and south on a collision course that could unleash a return to war. Under this school of thought, the National Congress Party will throw up procedural obstacles and other subterfuges to postpone the referendum indefinitely, prompting the SPLM to declare independence unilaterally. A new nation would be born, but under the imminent risk of attack from the north.
Such a scenario, however, is by no means inevitable. There is evidence that Khartoum, and for that matter other key countries in the region such as Egypt, are not only prepared to live (albeit warily) with an independent south, but have come to expect it. The Bashir government has scaled back its rhetoric against independence and senior Egyptian officials have quietly shuttled back and forth to Juba in recent months. The relevant question is no longer whether a new state will be born next year but whether it will live in peace with its neighbor and be a viable independent nation, not a ward of the international community.
While peace is a precondition for the viability of the new nation, it is no guarantee. Landlocked, poorly governed (to date), resource-rich and prone to conflict, the world’s 193rd nation (by UN count) would be born with all of the characteristics of the world’s most vulnerable states outlined by Oxford economist Paul Collier. With a government dependent on oil for 98 percent of its revenues and almost no infrastructure outside of Juba, it is already clear that donors will have to foot most of the bills, probably to the tune of billions of dollars annually to help the government stay above water.
That said, a relapse of the civil war in the next year is unlikely despite the exceptionally low level of trust between Khartoum and Juba. The CPA has been bent many times since 2005 but has not broken, showing resilience under pressure. Despite the zero-sum mentality and brinksmanship that has characterized CPA implementation for years, at critical moments both sides have made tough compromises to keep the agreement alive. Both sides have calculated that the benefits of sticking to the agreement, while often painful, outweigh the costs of relapse. The Bashir administration wants to keep its grip on power and to normalize relations with the West if possible; for Juba the prize is and has always been independence. These outcomes are well in sight now and need not be mutually exclusive.
Success will require another round of compromise, however, particularly on oil revenues. Some form of revenue-sharing on oil will need to be maintained to soften the economic blow of southern succession for Khartoum. As it turns out, the geography of oil in Sudan does not lend itself to zero-sum thinking by either side, as the main reserves are south but the pipelines and refineries are in the north. Juba and Khartoum will have to cooperate if either side is to benefit. This reality, along with diplomatic pressures on a southern government that desires international recognition, will facilitate a compromise that keeps some oil revenues flowing to Khartoum (though probably less than the 50 percent cut it currently gets).
These negotiations need to begin in earnest now. They cannot wait until January 2011, the day after the referendum vote. By then, the six month transition to statehood should already be underway, with everything from border demarcation to securing diplomatic recognition on the to-do list, little of which will be easy. Khartoum will need assurance that southern independence will not come at its expense, whether economically or diplomatically. Here the U.S. administration has a critical, albeit politically difficult, role to play by taking concrete measures towards sanctions removal and normalization if the elections are relatively credible and the referendum takes place on schedule. This diplomatic carrot, which has been dangled for years, would give Khartoum further incentive to accept southern independence.
Even if this relatively peaceful scenario transpires over the next 10 months, it is not at all clear that the newly independent south will be a self-sufficient, viable state. Juba’s natural allies (including the United States, European Union and neighbors in the region such as Kenya and Ethiopia) are all worried that southern Sudan could become Africa’s next basket-case, not to mention an inspiration for separatist movements across the continent, beginning with other regions in Sudan such as Darfur. Competition for scarce resources already pits communities and ethnic groups against one another, leading to casualty figures in the south that outnumbered those in Darfur last year. It may be that by January 2012, the newspaper headlines on Sudan will not be warning of a return to war between north and south, but rather of growing disappointment, ethnic rivalry, and unrest within the south itself.
Philippe de Pontet is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at Eurasia Group.
Saturday, March 27, 2010
Palm Sunday (C)
The Dhikr for Palm Sunday (C)
Text: Then he said, "Jesus, remember me when you come into your kingdom." He replied to him, "Amen, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise." (Luke 23: 42-43)
Reflection: The Palm of Triumph
The peaceful figure of Jesus rises above the hostility and anger of the crowds and the legal process. Jesus remains a true model of reconciliation, forgiveness and peace. In the midst of his own agony and trial, we realize the depths of Jesus' passion for unity: He is capable of uniting even Pilate and Herod together in friendship (23:12). From the cross, Luke presents Jesus forgiving his persecutors (23:34) and the dying Jesus allows even a thief to steal paradise! (23:43).
DHIKR PRAYER SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, Dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Text: Then he said, "Jesus, remember me when you come into your kingdom." He replied to him, "Amen, I say to you, today you will be with me in Paradise." (Luke 23: 42-43)
Reflection: The Palm of Triumph
The peaceful figure of Jesus rises above the hostility and anger of the crowds and the legal process. Jesus remains a true model of reconciliation, forgiveness and peace. In the midst of his own agony and trial, we realize the depths of Jesus' passion for unity: He is capable of uniting even Pilate and Herod together in friendship (23:12). From the cross, Luke presents Jesus forgiving his persecutors (23:34) and the dying Jesus allows even a thief to steal paradise! (23:43).
DHIKR PRAYER SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, Dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Saturday, March 20, 2010
5th Sunday in Lent (C)
The Dhikr for the 5th Sunday in Lent (C)
Text: “Then Jesus straightened up and said to her, ‘Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?’ She replied, ‘No one, sir.’ Then Jesus said, ‘Neither do I condemn you. Go, (and) from now on do not sin any more.’” (Luke 8: 10-11)
Reflection: The gospel tells us that God does not condemn us… in fact gives us the grace not only to free us from our past but the opportunity begin anew… Such is the LOVE of God that he offered his only begotten Son that we may have new LIFE!
DHIKR PRAYER SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, Dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Text: “Then Jesus straightened up and said to her, ‘Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?’ She replied, ‘No one, sir.’ Then Jesus said, ‘Neither do I condemn you. Go, (and) from now on do not sin any more.’” (Luke 8: 10-11)
Reflection: The gospel tells us that God does not condemn us… in fact gives us the grace not only to free us from our past but the opportunity begin anew… Such is the LOVE of God that he offered his only begotten Son that we may have new LIFE!
DHIKR PRAYER SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, Dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
How can forgiveness help me to see in a new way?
How can forgiveness help me to see in a new way?
As long as you can deal with evil by some other means than forgiveness, you will never experience the real meaning of evil and sin. You will keep projecting it over there, fearing it over there and attacking it over there, instead of “gazing” on it within yourself and “weeping” over it within all of us (see Zechariah 12:10).
The longer you gaze, the more you will see your own complicity in and profit from the sin of others, even if it is the satisfaction of feeling you are on higher moral ground than other people.
Forgiveness is probably the only human action that demands three new “seeings” at the same time:
I must see God in the other who has offended me,
I must access God in myself to forgive major grievances, and
I must meet God in a very new way that is larger than as an enforcer or a judge.
(Adapted from Richard Rohr, OFM. Things Hidden: Scripture as Spirituality, p. 194)
As long as you can deal with evil by some other means than forgiveness, you will never experience the real meaning of evil and sin. You will keep projecting it over there, fearing it over there and attacking it over there, instead of “gazing” on it within yourself and “weeping” over it within all of us (see Zechariah 12:10).
The longer you gaze, the more you will see your own complicity in and profit from the sin of others, even if it is the satisfaction of feeling you are on higher moral ground than other people.
Forgiveness is probably the only human action that demands three new “seeings” at the same time:
I must see God in the other who has offended me,
I must access God in myself to forgive major grievances, and
I must meet God in a very new way that is larger than as an enforcer or a judge.
(Adapted from Richard Rohr, OFM. Things Hidden: Scripture as Spirituality, p. 194)
Saturday, February 20, 2010
For a just and lasting peace in the Sudan...
FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE (Lk: 14:27)
To: Christians , Political leaders and People of Good Will!
Grace and Peace to you from God our Father and from the Lord Jesus Christ! (Eph.1:1)
We , the Catholic Bishops of the Sudan , meeting in Torit for our Annual Plenary from 5th – 15th December 2009 , reflecting and deliberating on the current situation of our country and mindful of our duty as spiritual leaders , wish to bring the following urgent and pertinent concerns to the attention of our Christians , political leaders and all citizens.
1. Current Situation of the Country
The political situation in our country has reached a crucial and decisive moment due to non implementation of some key component of the protocols:
a. the demarcation of the North and South borders
b. repeal of repressive laws and promulgation of referendum bill
c. forthcoming elections far behind schedule might affect the Referendum in 2011 and popular consultation for Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile States
d. the crisis in Abyei and the conflict in Darfur .
The delay of in the implementation of the above items creates sentiments of anxiety and fear among the people. We comment all initiatives taken by the two parties to implement the CPA.
2. On National Elections and the role of Civil Society
The CPA remains a valid and relevant road map for a just and lasting peace in Sudan.
+ Both the CPA and the Interim National Constitution confirm the right to vote as a fundamental right of Sudanese citizens.
+ The holding of free and fair elections is a key provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
+ Citizens should have the opportunity and the responsibility to exercise their right when elections are held under free and fair conditions.
+ Derailing the forthcoming election is unacceptable to Sudanese people and will be inconsistent with the peaceful and stable Sudan.
Unfortunately , voters’ civic education was not disseminated on time. Consequently , many people missed the right to register. For those who registered , we urge them to be vigilant and to exercise their constitutional right to vote.
3. Referendum and Post Referendum
The CPA provides for the right to self determination to the people of Southern Sudan through the international monitored referendum at end of the interim period which is only fifteen months away. The delay of the promulgation of the Referendum bill and the establishment of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission are of great concern to all Sudanese. We therefore call upon the National Legislative Assembly to speed up the process in order to avoid the unnecessary consequences that will be detrimental to the future of the country. We urge all Sudanese to be vigilant and not to give way to those who may drag the Country back to war.
4. No return to War!
It is painful to recall the memory of the two bitter wars (1955 – 1972 with about 1.6 million lives lost and from 1983 – 2005 with about 2.5 million lives lost and more than four million displaced) and the tragedy and devastation caused on human life , infrastructure and environment as we can still witness in many parts of Sudan today. War is evil and we cannot accept any return to war.
The interim period has brought stability and tangible development in the history of the Sudan , and we earnestly urge all the Sudanese to reject war and strongly call on parties to the CPA and the people of the Sudan to safeguard peace and find peaceful means to resolve pending issues.
The recent second assembly Synod of Bishops on Africa addressed with great concern the plight of Africa in their message: “ Africa , rise up! The Synod is sad to note that the situation in many countries is a great shame.... This Synod proclaims it loud and clear: it is time to change habits , for the sake of present and future generations.” (Nuntius , art. 36 – 37).
6. Ethnic Violence
We follow with great concern that , since the beginning of 2008 and 2009 , there have been increased attacks on civilians and Government installations , internal and external ethnic violence. These are not isolated incidents , but appear to be a coordinated campaign by the enemies of peace to oppose the CPA to destabilize the country. We urge both perpetrators and the victims that are caught up in these cycles of violence to denounce senseless killings , to seek reconciliation and to respect human life.
7. External Aggression
The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) aggression on innocent civilians especially Western Equatoria and Western Bhar El Ghazal States has created untold suffering and displacement to many people. We call upon the government of Uganda and the Lord Resistance Army to resume peace talk.
8. The Government of National Unity
We acknowledge that some items of the CPA have been successfully implemented , although many key items of the protocols remain unattended to. Considering that the interim period ends in fifteen months , we urge the Government of National Unity to expedite and honour the implementation of the remaining vital issues in the protocols.
9. The Government of Southern Sudan
We acknowledge that in this interim period there have been many tangible developments in Southern Sudan , notwithstanding the challenges faced , such as corruption , tribalism , nepotism , idleness , lack of patriotism , the lapse of security in enforcement of law and order.
We therefore call upon the Government and community leaders to be diligent in the practice of good governance and the rule of law. To govern means to serve honestly and to ensure the common good of the people entrusted to their care. The just enforcement of law and order remains a primary duty of the government and the community leaders.
10. The Religious Leaders
We appeal to the religious leaders in the country , that is , Christians and Muslims , to claim and adopt the spirituality which promotes tolerance , harmony , mutual respect and peace. Together let us foster dialogue as a means to handle the negative scenarios which are emerging in the Country due to the current situation and convert them into elements of peace. Peace must be based on a policy of “verify , then trust”.
11. The International Community
Soon after the CPA was signed , the International Community turned their attention to the Darfur conflict. While not neglecting Darfur , we appeal to the International Community to engage Khartoum government to peaceful resolve the Darfur , and recommit themselves to the CPA within the next fifteen months and to pressure the two signatories to implement all the protocols of the CPA to guarantee peace in the Country. The Sudan seems to be on unstable ground. This sign of danger calls for urgent intervention by the International Institution that assisted the Sudan to achieve CPA.
12. The Humanitarian Assistance and Rehabilitation
The rehabilitation programs for refugees and IDP’s have failed as the resources have hardly been availed. A proper resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary to allow all Sudanese to in exile and Internally Displaced of their origin. The apparent lack of rain this year and incursion by LRA caused a humanitarian crisis. We appeal to the international community to avail assistance to this needy people.
13. A Call to Prayer:
“Repent , for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Mk 1:15).
We are approaching Christmas a time that prompts us to feelings of peace and joy. It educates us to solidarity with our Brothers and Sisters and to an awareness of the needs and sufferings of our people. We remember that Christ , the Prince of Peace , came among us as one who was lowly , humble servant. He is the Messiah who came to take away our sins and bring us into the Kingdom of Peace .
In this holy season of Advent , we exhort you to pray for a just and lasting peace in our Country. This moment of expectation of Christ , the Prince of Peace , has a great appeal to our hearts and is one of peace , calm , joy and hope. Advent is a time of conversion. John the Baptist’s proclamation , “prepare the way for the Lord , make his paths straight! (Lk: 3:4) , is an exhortation to genuine conversion and reformation of life. In our Country , the reality of the present situation never seems to match our expectation and our dreams for a just and lasting peace.
We your Bishops rely on Jesus Christ , the Prince of Peace. Let us unite in prayer for peace , harmony , and justice. We pray for a just and lasting peace in the Sudan , we your Spiritual leaders , conscious of the fate in which our Country finds itself , we exhort our faithful and people of good will to be vigilant in prayer (1 Pt. 5:8-9) during this decisive moment of our Country. Especially as we approach Christmas , let us recommit ourselves to be peacemakers. Blessed be the peacemakers; they can be recognised as children of God (Mt. 5:9).
We entrust our prayer through the intercession of Our Lady Queen of Peace , Saints Josephine Bakhita and Daniel Comboni to intercede for the Sudan !
H. L. Bishop Rudolf Deng Majak Bishop of Wau and President of SCBC
H.E Gabriel Cardinal Zubeir Wako Archbishop of Khartoum
H. G. Archbishop Paolino Lukudu Loro Archbishop of Juba
H. L. Bishop Erkolano Lodu Tombe Bishop of Yei
H. L. Bishop Macram Max Gassis Bishop of El Obeid
H. L. Bishop Caesar Mazzolari Bishop of Rumbek
H. L. Bishop Daniel Adwok Kur Auxiliary Bishop of Khartoum
H. L. Bishop Antonio Menegazzo Apostolic Administrator of El Obeid
H. L. Bishop Johnson Akio Mutek Bishop of Torit
H.L. Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala Bishop of Tombura - Yambio
Msgr. Roko Taban Mousa Apostolic Administrator of Malakal
H L. Bishop Vincent Mojwok Nyker Bishop Emeritus of Malakal
H.L. Bishop Paride Taban Bishop Emeritus of Torit
H.L. Bishop Joseph Gasi Abangite (Sick leave) Bishop Emeritus of Tombura – Yambio
________________________________
CATHOLIC INFORMATION SERVICE FOR AFRICA (CISA) Spreading news of the Catholic Church from Africa , to Africa and for Africa through E-Mail Do you have news , a report , statement , speech , document , press release or a new address?
For all these and also for subscription and any other information , please contact us at:
cisa@wananchi.com , or http://www.cisanewsafrica.org/
To: Christians , Political leaders and People of Good Will!
Grace and Peace to you from God our Father and from the Lord Jesus Christ! (Eph.1:1)
We , the Catholic Bishops of the Sudan , meeting in Torit for our Annual Plenary from 5th – 15th December 2009 , reflecting and deliberating on the current situation of our country and mindful of our duty as spiritual leaders , wish to bring the following urgent and pertinent concerns to the attention of our Christians , political leaders and all citizens.
1. Current Situation of the Country
The political situation in our country has reached a crucial and decisive moment due to non implementation of some key component of the protocols:
a. the demarcation of the North and South borders
b. repeal of repressive laws and promulgation of referendum bill
c. forthcoming elections far behind schedule might affect the Referendum in 2011 and popular consultation for Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile States
d. the crisis in Abyei and the conflict in Darfur .
The delay of in the implementation of the above items creates sentiments of anxiety and fear among the people. We comment all initiatives taken by the two parties to implement the CPA.
2. On National Elections and the role of Civil Society
The CPA remains a valid and relevant road map for a just and lasting peace in Sudan.
+ Both the CPA and the Interim National Constitution confirm the right to vote as a fundamental right of Sudanese citizens.
+ The holding of free and fair elections is a key provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
+ Citizens should have the opportunity and the responsibility to exercise their right when elections are held under free and fair conditions.
+ Derailing the forthcoming election is unacceptable to Sudanese people and will be inconsistent with the peaceful and stable Sudan.
Unfortunately , voters’ civic education was not disseminated on time. Consequently , many people missed the right to register. For those who registered , we urge them to be vigilant and to exercise their constitutional right to vote.
3. Referendum and Post Referendum
The CPA provides for the right to self determination to the people of Southern Sudan through the international monitored referendum at end of the interim period which is only fifteen months away. The delay of the promulgation of the Referendum bill and the establishment of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission are of great concern to all Sudanese. We therefore call upon the National Legislative Assembly to speed up the process in order to avoid the unnecessary consequences that will be detrimental to the future of the country. We urge all Sudanese to be vigilant and not to give way to those who may drag the Country back to war.
4. No return to War!
It is painful to recall the memory of the two bitter wars (1955 – 1972 with about 1.6 million lives lost and from 1983 – 2005 with about 2.5 million lives lost and more than four million displaced) and the tragedy and devastation caused on human life , infrastructure and environment as we can still witness in many parts of Sudan today. War is evil and we cannot accept any return to war.
The interim period has brought stability and tangible development in the history of the Sudan , and we earnestly urge all the Sudanese to reject war and strongly call on parties to the CPA and the people of the Sudan to safeguard peace and find peaceful means to resolve pending issues.
The recent second assembly Synod of Bishops on Africa addressed with great concern the plight of Africa in their message: “ Africa , rise up! The Synod is sad to note that the situation in many countries is a great shame.... This Synod proclaims it loud and clear: it is time to change habits , for the sake of present and future generations.” (Nuntius , art. 36 – 37).
6. Ethnic Violence
We follow with great concern that , since the beginning of 2008 and 2009 , there have been increased attacks on civilians and Government installations , internal and external ethnic violence. These are not isolated incidents , but appear to be a coordinated campaign by the enemies of peace to oppose the CPA to destabilize the country. We urge both perpetrators and the victims that are caught up in these cycles of violence to denounce senseless killings , to seek reconciliation and to respect human life.
7. External Aggression
The Lord Resistance Army (LRA) aggression on innocent civilians especially Western Equatoria and Western Bhar El Ghazal States has created untold suffering and displacement to many people. We call upon the government of Uganda and the Lord Resistance Army to resume peace talk.
8. The Government of National Unity
We acknowledge that some items of the CPA have been successfully implemented , although many key items of the protocols remain unattended to. Considering that the interim period ends in fifteen months , we urge the Government of National Unity to expedite and honour the implementation of the remaining vital issues in the protocols.
9. The Government of Southern Sudan
We acknowledge that in this interim period there have been many tangible developments in Southern Sudan , notwithstanding the challenges faced , such as corruption , tribalism , nepotism , idleness , lack of patriotism , the lapse of security in enforcement of law and order.
We therefore call upon the Government and community leaders to be diligent in the practice of good governance and the rule of law. To govern means to serve honestly and to ensure the common good of the people entrusted to their care. The just enforcement of law and order remains a primary duty of the government and the community leaders.
10. The Religious Leaders
We appeal to the religious leaders in the country , that is , Christians and Muslims , to claim and adopt the spirituality which promotes tolerance , harmony , mutual respect and peace. Together let us foster dialogue as a means to handle the negative scenarios which are emerging in the Country due to the current situation and convert them into elements of peace. Peace must be based on a policy of “verify , then trust”.
11. The International Community
Soon after the CPA was signed , the International Community turned their attention to the Darfur conflict. While not neglecting Darfur , we appeal to the International Community to engage Khartoum government to peaceful resolve the Darfur , and recommit themselves to the CPA within the next fifteen months and to pressure the two signatories to implement all the protocols of the CPA to guarantee peace in the Country. The Sudan seems to be on unstable ground. This sign of danger calls for urgent intervention by the International Institution that assisted the Sudan to achieve CPA.
12. The Humanitarian Assistance and Rehabilitation
The rehabilitation programs for refugees and IDP’s have failed as the resources have hardly been availed. A proper resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary to allow all Sudanese to in exile and Internally Displaced of their origin. The apparent lack of rain this year and incursion by LRA caused a humanitarian crisis. We appeal to the international community to avail assistance to this needy people.
13. A Call to Prayer:
“Repent , for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Mk 1:15).
We are approaching Christmas a time that prompts us to feelings of peace and joy. It educates us to solidarity with our Brothers and Sisters and to an awareness of the needs and sufferings of our people. We remember that Christ , the Prince of Peace , came among us as one who was lowly , humble servant. He is the Messiah who came to take away our sins and bring us into the Kingdom of Peace .
In this holy season of Advent , we exhort you to pray for a just and lasting peace in our Country. This moment of expectation of Christ , the Prince of Peace , has a great appeal to our hearts and is one of peace , calm , joy and hope. Advent is a time of conversion. John the Baptist’s proclamation , “prepare the way for the Lord , make his paths straight! (Lk: 3:4) , is an exhortation to genuine conversion and reformation of life. In our Country , the reality of the present situation never seems to match our expectation and our dreams for a just and lasting peace.
We your Bishops rely on Jesus Christ , the Prince of Peace. Let us unite in prayer for peace , harmony , and justice. We pray for a just and lasting peace in the Sudan , we your Spiritual leaders , conscious of the fate in which our Country finds itself , we exhort our faithful and people of good will to be vigilant in prayer (1 Pt. 5:8-9) during this decisive moment of our Country. Especially as we approach Christmas , let us recommit ourselves to be peacemakers. Blessed be the peacemakers; they can be recognised as children of God (Mt. 5:9).
We entrust our prayer through the intercession of Our Lady Queen of Peace , Saints Josephine Bakhita and Daniel Comboni to intercede for the Sudan !
H. L. Bishop Rudolf Deng Majak Bishop of Wau and President of SCBC
H.E Gabriel Cardinal Zubeir Wako Archbishop of Khartoum
H. G. Archbishop Paolino Lukudu Loro Archbishop of Juba
H. L. Bishop Erkolano Lodu Tombe Bishop of Yei
H. L. Bishop Macram Max Gassis Bishop of El Obeid
H. L. Bishop Caesar Mazzolari Bishop of Rumbek
H. L. Bishop Daniel Adwok Kur Auxiliary Bishop of Khartoum
H. L. Bishop Antonio Menegazzo Apostolic Administrator of El Obeid
H. L. Bishop Johnson Akio Mutek Bishop of Torit
H.L. Eduardo Hiiboro Kussala Bishop of Tombura - Yambio
Msgr. Roko Taban Mousa Apostolic Administrator of Malakal
H L. Bishop Vincent Mojwok Nyker Bishop Emeritus of Malakal
H.L. Bishop Paride Taban Bishop Emeritus of Torit
H.L. Bishop Joseph Gasi Abangite (Sick leave) Bishop Emeritus of Tombura – Yambio
________________________________
CATHOLIC INFORMATION SERVICE FOR AFRICA (CISA) Spreading news of the Catholic Church from Africa , to Africa and for Africa through E-Mail Do you have news , a report , statement , speech , document , press release or a new address?
For all these and also for subscription and any other information , please contact us at:
cisa@wananchi.com
Short Reflection for the 1st Sunday in Lent (C)
The Dhikr for the 1st Sunday in Lent (C)
Text: (4) "It is written, 'One does not live by bread alone.” (8) "It is written: 'You shall worship the Lord, your God, and him alone shall you serve.'" (12) "It also says, 'You shall not put the Lord, your God, to the test.'" (Luke 4: verses 4, 8, and 12)
Reflection: Each one is invited to reflect on Jesus’ responses (the above verses) to the three temptations confronting him as he began his public ministry - Bread, Wealth and Power! Do we easily succumb to the temptations…?
DHIKR PRAYER SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, Dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
Text: (4) "It is written, 'One does not live by bread alone.” (8) "It is written: 'You shall worship the Lord, your God, and him alone shall you serve.'" (12) "It also says, 'You shall not put the Lord, your God, to the test.'" (Luke 4: verses 4, 8, and 12)
Reflection: Each one is invited to reflect on Jesus’ responses (the above verses) to the three temptations confronting him as he began his public ministry - Bread, Wealth and Power! Do we easily succumb to the temptations…?
DHIKR PRAYER SIMPLE METHOD...
Dhikr is an Arabic word for remembrance. In the “tariqa” (the way) movement, Dhikr developed into a form of prayer… It is a prayer of the heart… following three simple steps:
1. Write in one’s heart a certain passage of the Holy Writ…
2. Make the same passage ever present in one’s lips.
3. Then wait for God’s disclosure on the meaning of the passage…that interprets one’s life NOW…!
It takes a week of remembering (dhikr)…or even more days to relish the beauty of this method…
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