South Sudan - Possibility of National Dialogue?

Sudan: The Prospects for “National Dialogue”

Africa Briefing N°10811 Mar 2015

AFP PHOTO/ABDULLAH DOMA

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OVERVIEW

Prospects for an inclusive national dialogue President Omar al-Bashir promised in January 2014 are fading, making a soft-landing end to Sudan’s crises more doubtful. Sceptics who warned that the ruling party was unwilling and unable to make needed concessions have been vindicated. Peacemaking in Darfur and the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan) and potential merging of these negotiations with the national dialogue were dealt a blow with suspension of African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP)-mediated “parallel” talks in Addis Ababa in December. A separate German-backed initiative has elicited a more unified and constructive approach from the armed and unarmed opposition, but no breakthrough yet. The government still holds many cards – including formidable means of coercion – and has little sympathy for the increasingly unified demand of the armed and political opposition for a really inclusive process and true power sharing. Unless both sides give ground, a continuation of intense war and humanitarian crises is inevitable.

The offer of national dialogue was prompted by a series of events – partly due to unaddressed consequences of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and South Sudan’s 2011 independence – including large, violently repressed nationwide September 2013 protests in Khartoum and other cities, followed by a costly, unsuccessful and unpopular military campaign in South Kordofan. But almost as soon as the government’s offer of dialogue was announced, there was a crackdown on opposition activists and the media. The recently-formed paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reportedly were deployed in Khartoum to quell protests. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), alongside the RSF, have since renewed their “hot dry season” campaign against the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebel coalition in the southern peripheries and Darfur.

Opportunism and divisions within the civilian and armed opposition have given the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) a respite. While other parties refused to participate in or withdrew from the preparatory National Dialogue Committee (NDC), some Islamist, traditional and smaller parties remained, looking to maximise their share of government posts in return for lending credibility to planned April elections that other major parties will boycott, further polarising the country. The December 2014 “Sudan Call”, which reflected a growing unity of demands from the political opposition, civil society and armed groups, came too late to influence the NDC’s discussion in August of the parameters for the dialogue and was immediately rejected by the government. However, the opposition’s more sophisticated approach at subsequent meetings in Berlin has improved prospects for an inclusive preparatory meeting before the election.

The NCP has reason to believe Sudan’s vulnerable regional and wider international position has improved. The International Criminal Court (ICC) decision to “suspend” its Darfur work gives the president more confidence he will not be prosecuted. Pressure from anti-Muslim Brotherhood Arab and Gulf states has eased somewhat. Meanwhile, the civil war in South Sudan has distracted the SRF, an increase in gold exports has relieved economic pressure, and the steep drop in oil prices has been weathered, because Sudan now imports much of its fuel, and its substantial income from oil transport fees is fixed. But this betterment of the government’s political and military position is fragile and reversible; fundamental, dangerous weaknesses remain.

As Crisis Group has argued in previous reports, a peaceful, political solution through an inclusive national dialogue would be a vital step toward ending the violent protests at the centre and wars in the periphery that could otherwise lead to Sudan’s further fragmentation. The NCP, and the military-security apparatus in particular, are unlikely to submit to another “CPA” process requiring them to share power in Khartoum with a still-armed opposition, but might accommodate greater regional administrative autonomy if they can continue to dominate the centre.

Western donors’ influence is much reduced, and the responsibilities for mediating the fighting, encouraging recommitment to inclusive dialogue and bearing the burden and cost of instability now mostly fall to the AU (especially the AUHIP, which is mandated to mediate the proposed national dialogue); immediate African neighbours; Arab friends (collectively the Gulf Cooperation Council); and China, given its huge investments. These actors could exert greater and coordinated influence for remedial actions that would improve the chances for more talk and less war by:

• pressing the opposition and government to participate in an inclusive preparatory meeting for the national dialogue, hosted and mediated by the AUHIP prior to the national elections, to forge clear terms of reference and common positions to which all parties are fully committed;
• urging the AU Technical Assessment Mission to consider the impact an AU observation mission to a controversial election might have on the AUHIP’s mandate in the national dialogue process;
• encouraging opposition parties and civil society to develop further a common position on the national dialogue through trusted third-country facilitation (eg, the German-sponsored initiative);
• pushing the government and opposition to re-engage with the AUHIP’s strategy for a parallel and loosely synchronised process of talks on the Two Areas and Darfur; and
• consideration by China of how its economic investments can better address regional inequalities that are fuelling continued wars.

Nairobi/Brussels, 11 March 2015 ICG

Restart South Sudan Peace Talks

Another round of South Sudan peace talks mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (The members of IGAD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya and Uganda) in Addis Ababa has failed. The regional organisation was unable to alter the domestic and neighbouring nations’ military, political and economic calculus favouring further war, because its own divisions prevented it from applying concerted pressure for compromise. Its limitations laid bare, IGAD now calls, sensibly, for mediation to be led by an expanded “IGAD Plus” group that may include the African Union (AU), China, the U.S., UK, Norway and European Union (EU). But talks are dangerously suspended until April. Meanwhile, fracturing within both the government and the opposition coalitions threatens to substantially expand and complicate the war. The government has offered Sudan Peoples Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) members an amnesty until 31 March, after which a major offensive is likely. It is thus critical to restart preparatory talks and intense diplomacy before the end of this month.

The government’s army, the SPLA, has been gaining ground since May 2014 thanks to major arms purchases, improved tactics and the influence and presence of the Ugandan army. Many in the SPLA increasingly see little reason for concessions to the SPLA-IO. The amnesty is unacceptable to most in the SPLA-IO, who would be expected to return to the SPLA without political guarantees and with their former ranks, while many officers who remained with the government have been promoted. The government feels urgency to push for victory, as a looming fiscal crisis threatens its fragile coalition, much of which is built upon patronage networks running short of cash. Disgruntlement in important parts of the country – the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal – is mushrooming into new opposition groups, only some of which are affiliated to the SPLM-IO, where tensions over military and political strategy as well as personalities threaten the movement’s hard-forged unity. 

REPORT | South Sudan: Jonglei – “We Have Always Been at War”, 22 December 2014

The priority for IGAD Plus must be to secure peace between what for the moment at least are still two broad groupings. No time should be lost engaging hardliners on both sides so as to stop those not in Addis Ababa from spoiling the process. To deter emerging anti-Juba groups from joining the war, a final agreement must have provisions for governance reform that address their grievances. All this requires substantial, coordinated work by IGAD Plus in the region as well as in South Sudan. In particular, giving it special observer status might facilitate Uganda contributing to the negotiations more systematically than at the Heads of State summits. The new mediation should also more carefully weigh how to use both the forms of pressure at its disposal – such as personal sanctions, asset freezes, travel bans, an arms embargo, criminal accountability and use of force – and the types of incentives that might be provided (and by which partner) to encourage compromise. 

REPORT | Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts, 29 January 2015

Monitoring and upholding the cessation of hostilities agreement – one of the IGAD talks’ few successes – is vital; there are frequent skirmishes, but it has prevented return to full-scale war.  However, the beleaguered IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mission (MVM) needs urgent improvement; its reporting is not timely and does not regularly identify individuals responsible for violations. Finally, the new UN Security Council sanctions regime needs to be used carefully to support the peace process –  flawed information has already led at least one individual who was not present during an atrocity to be targeted for EU sanction. 

CONFLICT ALERT | Looming Military Offensives in South Sudan, 29 October 2014

To prevent full-scale war taking hold again while the mediation is being restructured, IGAD Plus, including existing envoys, must: 

• pre-empt a government offensive by immediately beginning preparatory work – including with both warring parties – in South Sudan and the region before the next round of talks;
• utilise the preparatory period to establish IGAD Plus’s mediation strategy, including how and by which member to mix pressure and incentives;
• pay specific attention to the conflict’s regional dimensions, including by giving special observer status to Uganda;
• prioritise dialogue with hardline military commanders on both sides to stop those not in Addis Ababa from undermining the process; and
• significantly reform the IGAD MVM to: 
• enable the SPLA-IO to rejoin, which may require establishing an operational base in the SPLA-IO’s Pagak headquarters and moving the Joint Technical Committee from Juba to Addis Ababa; 
• report violations to IGAD Plus and the Security Council within 72 hours; and 
• identify individuals, not just armed groups, responsible for violations, so the Security Council can better justify potential individual sanctions. (Source: ICG)

Palm Sunday of the Lord's Passion (B)

Short Reflection for Palm Sunday of the Lord’s Passion (B)

Readings: Isaiah 50: 4-7; Philippians 2: 6-11; Mark 14: 1 - 15: 47

Selected Passage:  “Those passing by reviled him, shaking their heads and saying: ‘Aha! You would destroy the temple and rebuild it in three days, save yourself by coming down from the cross’. Likewise, the chief priests, with the scribes, mocked him among themselves and said, ‘he saved others; he cannot save himself. Let the Christ, the King of Israel, come down now from the cross that we may see and believe’.” (Mark 15: 29-32)

Reflection:  The crucified Christ is the powerful symbol of God’s love - ‘greater love than this no one has… to give one’s own life for his friends’. Jesus calls us his friends and we are ransomed from our sins by his blood. The ‘Suffering Servant of Yahweh’ embraced all sufferings unto death that all creation may have life and life to the full.  Thus in our sufferings, sins, trials and difficulties, we look at the one exalted in the Cross to receive life and healing.

www.badaliyya.blogspot.com

5th Sunday in Lent (B)

Short Reflection for the 5th Week of Lent (B)

Readings: Jeremiah 31: 33-34; Hebrew 5: 7-9; John 12: 20-33

Gospel Passage: “Amen, amen, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls to the ground and dies, it remains just a grain of wheat; but if it dies, it produces much fruit.” (Jn. 12: 24)

Short Reflection: In the coming days, the mystery of “falling and dying” and “producing much fruit” will unfold in that event of Jesus’s dying for us and rising from the dead.  We, too,  are invited to enter into this mystery through our own experiences of dying to sin, selfishness, and ‘littleness’… only to rise with Jesus in the new life of his Resurrection.

See: http://badaliyya.blogspot.com/

4th Sunday in Lent (B)

Short Reflection for the 4^th Sunday of Lent (B)

Readings: 1 Chronicles 36: 14-16. 19-24: Ephesians 2: 4-10; John 3: 14-21

Selected Passage: “And this is the verdict, that the light came into the world, but people preferred darkness to light, because their works were evil.  For everyone who does wicked things hates the light and does not come toward the light, so that his works might not be exposed.” (Jn. 3: 19-20)

Short Reflection: Lent is a special season to LOOK at the VERDICT on our own life.  The verdict is NOT based on words and utterance but by our deeds and our witness that give either life or death.  Life is from God while death is from the evil one!  www.badlaiyya.blogspot.com 

3rd Sunday of Lent (B)

Short Reflection for the 3rd Sunday of Lent (B)

Readings: Exodus 20: 1-17; 1 Corinthians 1: 22-25; John 2: 13-25

Selected Passage: “Jesus said, "Take these out of here, and stop making my Father's house a marketplace." (Jn.2: 16)

Reflection: Lent is a special season to cleanse our life of the many “merchandise” that has made God’s abode in us a MARKETPLACE. Grace, Blessings and the Kingdom of God are not commodities for sale. They are God’s free and generous gifts to us!

www.badaliyya.blogspot.com